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Let therefore this my well advised protestation... to condemn
me herein, if my chiefest intent and purpose be not, to strive with
all my power of body and minde, in the undertaking of so mighty
a matter, no way led.., with the unbridled desire of carnall
affection: but for the good of this plantation,for the honour of
our countrie,for the glor6.of God,for my owne salvation,andfor
the converting to the true knowledge of God and Jesus Christ,an
unbelieving creature,namely Pokahuntas.'
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1. John Rolfe, Letter to Sir Thomas Dale (Apr. 1614), in THE INDIAN AND THE WHITE MAN
22 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1964) (also available in RALPH HAMOR, A TRUE DISCOURSE OF
THE PRESENT ESTATE OF VIRGINIA (London 1615)).
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Walt Disney did nothing new in celebrating Pocahontas; she has long been
the most famous Indian in non-Indian American culture. While the movie
makers congratulate themselves on their selection of a nonwhite heroine,
however, Pocahontas owes her fame to the fact that she married a white man,
took a white name, and converted to the white man's religion - in effect, she
became white. Any remaining threat her presence might have presented to the
white European culture was contained by her early death from a Europeanderived disease. Pocahontas's "whiteness" was not only cultural but legal. As
the Supreme Court pointed out in Loving v. Virginia,2 her descendants (as
long as they didn't dilute John Rolfe's blood by marrying outside the white
race) were legally white under Virginia law.3
L Introduction
The story of Pocahontas, simultaneously celebrated and contained, presents
the favored path for Native American women in the newer legal culture:
absorption into the Euro-American race and ultimate disappearance of the
non-European element. The alternative path was reserved for women whose
assimilation did not reach this level of absorption and disappearance but
retained their allegiance to both the Indian and white society. Federal and
state legislatures and courts marginalized such women, denied them the treaty
rights accorded their male companions, and denied them stable marriages,
rights of descent, and the power within the family that they had had within
Indian culture. As white people and white values encroached ever further into
formerly untouched Indian communities, and as the standards for acceptable
assimilation grew higher, this second category came to include virtually all
Indian women.
With few exceptions, no one has studied the ways in which the role of
Indian women - as property owners, as wives, as heads of families, as
members of their communities - was defined by American law throughout
(and even before) the history of the United States.4 Indeed, in Felix Cohen's

2. 388 U.S. 1, 5 n.4 (1967) (holding law that voided marriage between a white person and
"colored person" unlawful).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1960 replacement vol.) ("[P]ersons who have one-sixteenth or
less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed
to be white persons."). This exception was designed to recognize "as an integral and honored part
of the white race the descendants of John Rolfe and Pocahontas." Walter Wadlington, The Loving
Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REv. 1189,
1202, n.93 (1966).
4. The great exception to this has been the numerous articles generated by Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez. 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (holding that the Indian Civil Rights Act could not
be used to challenge a tribal law that excluded children of Santa Claran women - not men who married outside the tribe). One of the best of these articles is Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States and the FederalCourts, 56 U. CH. L. REv. 671 (1989). The
legal history discussed in the article, however, is focused almost exclusively on the five years

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol21/iss1/2

No. 1]

INDIAN WOMEN AND THE LAW

3

definitive treatise, the Handbook of Federal Indian Law, neither "women,"
"wives," nor "mothers" warrants even an index entry.5 Francis Prucha's
equally authoritative work on federal Indian policy similarly excludes Native
American women from sustained consideration. 6
This article attempts to begin to fill this gap. Starting from the federal and
state7 case law of the century preceding the Indian New Deal of 1934, I
examine the ways judges and legislators perceived and treated Indian women
in the century preceding this watershed in federal Indian law.
This is not an attempt to uncover what Indian tribes "really" thought of
Indian women or how women were treated by the Native American legal
tradition. Besides the obvious objections to such an attempt,' for the most

surrounding passage of the discriminatory provision. Id. at 705-25; see also Catharine
MacKinnon, A Case Note on Santa ClaraPueblo v. Martinez, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 63, 66

(1987) (acknowledging that Martinez is a hard case); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 593 (1990) (taking MacKinnon to task for her
essentialist condemnation of the Martinez rule).
A good article using legal history in a different context is James W. Zion & Elsie B. Zion,
Hozho'Sokee'- Stay TogetherNicely: Domestic Violence Under Navajo Common Law, 25 ARIZ.

ST. L.J. 407, 412 (1993), in which the authors discuss traditional ways of preventing domestic
violence in Navajo common law. Other partial exceptions include Linda J. Lacey, The White
Man'sLaw and the American IndianFamily in the Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 327 (1986)

(looking at assimilationist policy regarding the Indian family from 1880 to 1900), and Shirley R.
Bysiewicz & Ruth E. Van de Mark, The Legal Status of the Dakota Indian Woman, 3 AM.

INDIAN L. REV. 255 (1975) (considering federal laws affecting Dakota women until the time of
the article). Both of the latter, however, focus solely on federal Indian law, and there largely on
statutory law, and thus miss both the subtleties of the shaping of the definition of Indian women
in the case law and the perhaps more interesting decisions which occurred at the state level.
The relatively few other legal works that concern the legal treatment of Indian women fail to
adequately consider the complexities that the combination of gendered and racial/national
oppression bring to their subject. An early article regarding the legal recognition of Indian
marriage and divorce, for example, utterly ignores the gendered effect of the decisions discussed
and accepts without question the long standing misconception that Indian marriage and divorce
were completely without form or restraint. Henry H. Foster, Indian and Common Law Marriages,
3 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 83 (1975). On the other side of the spectrum, a recent piece generated in
response to the Martinez decision responds to this decision completely on gender equality
grounds, ignoring the struggle for sovereignty that undergirded both the decision and possibly the
discriminatory law. Carla Christofferson, Note, Tribal Courts' Failureto ProtectNative American
Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169 (1991).
5. FELIx S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 137 (Five Rings 1986) (reprint

of Univ. of N.M. photo. reprint 1971) (1942).
6. 2 FRANCIS PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER (1984). The 40-page index of this massive work

points to two pages on which Indian women are discussed, and another three on which
intermarriage is mentioned. Id. at 1261-1302.
7. In contrast to much Native American legal history, many of the relevant documents for
women are not federal cases or treaties but instead are generated by the state courts. It was often
at the state level that judges combined the shifting national perception of the "Indian problem"
with local exigencies of that problem, particularly in their treatment of traditional state law
matters such as descent, marriage, and property law.
8. First, as there are over five hundred nations included in the title "Native American," such
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part the sources necessary to identify an original Indian legal tradition simply

do not exist. The Indian legal tradition was generally customary and oral, not
fixed and written! To the extent that written sources survive from the
nineteenth century, they seem to reflect the will of the government officials
who inspired them as much as that of the Indian people who enacted them."
Non-legal sources also suffer from the "problem of disentangling the viewer
from the viewed."" Writings on the Native American woman suffer multiply
from this entanglement, alternating between vilification and the recent
uncritical adulation of gender relationships among Native Americans, eliding
the middle which surely lay between. Like most Native American legal

history, therefore, this article will "look primarily to conventional non-Indian
sources," remembering that "[g]enerally, the relevant question under this

colonially derived body of legal doctrine is not what Indian tribes or their
governing institutions were doing at a particular time,""2 but how federal and

a project is well beyond the scope of any single work. Second, a student confined in a library
should think twice about her competence to undertake such a task. See VINE DELORIA, JR.,
CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 5 (1969), on problematic yet all too quickly asserted claims to
"understand" Indians. See also Resnik, supra note 4, at 709-12, for a thoughtful discussion of the
problem of identifying the "real" early Indian culture to use to make arguments about the
appropriateness of Indian laws.
9. See. e.g., Ken Traisman, Note, Native Law and Order Among Eighteenth-Century
Cherokee, GreatPlains,CentralPrairie,and Woodland Indians, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 273, 274
(1983). A modem exception is the Navajo Nation, which has codified a body of Navajo common
law and utilizes it as a significant element in the jurisprudence of the Navajo judicial system. See
Daniel L. Lowery, Notes & Comments, Developing a Tribal Common Law Jurisprudence: The
Navajo Experience, 1969-1992, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 379 (1993); Zion & Zion, supra note 4.
For a cursory discussion of early tribal legal systems, see Traisman, supra.
10. See. for example, the Code of Law established in 1875 by the Blackfeet, Blood and
Piegan Tribes, of Montana. Notes of Council Meeting, Blackfeet Agency, Mont. (Apr. 23, 1875)
(in Felix Cohen Papers and on file with author). Although the Code accords with tribal custom
in forbidding rape or battery of a wife, female relative, or other woman (articles 6 and 8), the
meeting at which the Code was established was called by the federal Indian agent, John S. Wood,
and addresses central concerns of non-Indian reformers such as a prohibition on taking more than
one wife (article 7), and on buying, selling, or keeping liquor (article 12).
11. Resnik, supra note 4, at 708 (noting that interpretations of gender roles among Indian
tribes "may reflect more about the dualistic modeling of nineteenth and twentieth century
anthropologists than the societies that they study"); see also MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN
WOMEN'S HZSTORY (Mary Beth Norton & Ruth M. Alexander eds., 2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter
PROBLEMS IN WOMEN'S HISTORY]. In introducing a section on Native American women, the
editors write that
mhe vast majority of surviving accounts [of encounters between whites and
Native Americans) exists only in the words of Europeans. Such sources reflect the
bias of the authors, who were in the main elite, well-educated men with specific
goals... The documents, accordingly, must be read creatively and with great care
in order to avoid making the same cultural preconceptions as the men who
produced them.
Id. at 20.
12. Robert N. Clinton, The Curse of Relevance: An Essay on the Relationship of Historical
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state governments responded to the legal challenges posed by the clash
between Indian and non-Indian societies.
These sources, although limited, are rich. Through the cases the courts,
albeit often through a lens of bigotry and prejudice, present histories of
women whose stories are rarely told, who often could not write, and who may
not have spoken English." Here, for example, is the story of a grandmother,
repeatedly moved off her land yet struggling to remain, 4 of a white man who
made a fortune in Indian country then abandoned his Indian wife to a convent
in favor of a "reputable" white woman, 5 and the story of the mixed-blood
Frank Camille, whom a federal judge declared "as much an Indian as a white
person, and ... classed with the one race as properly as the other. Strictly
speaking, he belongs to neither."' 6 But the cases are, of course, more than
stories. From each understanding of history the judge provides, comes a
shaping of history. By articulating assumptions and rules regarding the
relationships of Indian women to their partners and children, the judges
transform those relationships.
Equally important, it has long been true that one cannot understand where
American Indians legally are without understanding where they have been. As
the Secretary of the Interior stated in 1941, "Federal Indian law is a subject
that cannot be understood if the historical dimension of existing law is
ignored."' 8 The historical dimension of the legal status of Indian women has
only recently been considered, and then only in the distorting context of hotly
contested litigation. It is time to begin to uncover how non-Indian judges and
legislators were thinking about Indian women and their children, to analyze
their (mis)conceptions of how Indian law treated them, and to hypothesize the
effects on the women and their communities of the legal rules thus created.
In part 2, I outline the two historical trends of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries with the greatest impact on Native American women: the
devastating path of federal Indian policy and the development of the "cult of
true womanhood" in American culture. In part 3, I discuss the ways in which
federal and state judicial decisions and legislation affected Indian women in

Research to FederalIndian Litigation, 28 ARiz. L. REv. 29, 44 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Kalyton v. Kalyton, 74 P. 491,494 (Or. 1903) (noting woman testified to facts

of her marriage through an interpreter).
14. Rowland v. Ladiga's Heirs, 21 Ala. 9 (1852); In re Heme, 232 N.Y.S. 415 (Sup. Ct.

1928).
15. Connolly v. Woolrich, 17 R.J.R.Q. 75 (Que. Sup. Ct. 1867) (also reported at 11 L.C. Jur.
197 and in I CANADIAN NATIVE LAw CASES 70 (Brian Slattery et al. eds., 1980) (covering cases
from the years 1763-1869)).
16. In re Camille, 6 F. 256, 258 (D. Ore. 1880).
17. Rather, as Robert Cover wrote, "[1]egal interpretation takes place on a field of pain and
death." Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J 1601, 1601 (1986). Judges are
not critics, poets, or artists, and legal opinions do not merely interpret, but explicitly change, what
happens to the people they concern. Id.
18. Nathan Margold, Introduction, in COHEN, supra note 5, at XXI.
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the century prior to the Indian New Deal. I divide these cases and laws into
three parts: those that decided the status of Indian women directly,
diminishing the power and autonomy of women in tribal communities; those
that decided the status of Indian women as wives, giving access to tribal
property to white husbands while allowing Indian and white husbands to end
their legal obligations to Indian women at will; and those that decided the
status of Indian women as mothers, either facilitating the separation of
children from their mothers and their assimilation into non-Indian culture, or
using the identity of the mother to label and stigmatize the child. In part 4,
I look at several instances in which tribes themselves force Indian women
from tribal land or otherwise diminish their power, and discuss the ways in
which nontribal policies may have influenced these actions. In conclusion, I
reevaluate the legacy of Indian women in American culture and the
paradoxical status of Pocahontas in light of that legacy.
I. The Nineteenth Century and Indian Women: Federal Indian Policy and
the Cult of True Womanhood
Two separate threads helped to shape the cases and laws that affected
Indian women in the nineteenth century. The first was the rapid development
in federal Indian policy and control during this period. The second was the
emergence of the cult of true womanhood or domesticity in the social realm.
The case and statutory law that I examine here begins with the Removal
Period of the 1830s, spans the Reservationist period of the 1850s through the
1870s, and ends in the Assimilationist period of the 1880s through the 1920s.
I stop at the brink of the Indian New Deal of 1934, long heralded as a sea
change in federal Indian policy. Each of these periods significantly affected
Native American women, often in the same ways that they affected Native
American men, by pushing them off their land, bringing them into greater
contact with whites, and confining them in ever smaller areas under every
greater federal control. These developments also had distinctive effects on
women, however, as federal Indian policy was often shaped with an eye to
creating families and economies in which women's role was fundamentally
altered.
Andrew Jackson's administration began the Removal Period, called by one
nineteenth century lawyer a forty year "period of compulsory emigration
under the form of consent by voluntary treaty."' 9 With his ascent to the
presidency in 1828, Jackson gained the means to implement his long held
view that Indians should be removed from areas of white settlement by force
rather than persuasion, and to end what he believed was the farce of treating
with the Indian tribes as though they were sovereign nations."0 Under the

19. Austin Abbot, Indians and the Law, 2 HARV. L. REV. 167, 171 (1888).
20. 1 FRANcis PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 191 (1984).
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guise of treaty agreement and the guns of armed troops, almost all the eastern
tribes, beginning with the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and
Seminole tribes of the Southeastern states, were moved to the Indian Territory
in what was to become Oklahoma. Thousands of Indians died walking this
Trail of Tears, and many tribes were practically destroyed.2'
With the national expansion of the 1840s, westward removal no longer
sufficed to separate white from Indian. The federal government established
reservations, then progressively whittled them away to open still more land
for white settlement.' The loss of traditional hunting lands, the decimation
and impoverishment of removal and war, created in the Indians a new
dependence on American rations and bureaucracy. In 1871, after the Indian
Wars and relatively favorable treaties of the late 1860s, Congress declared that
Indian tribes were no longer to be dealt with through treaty." This began the
Reservation Period, a period of near-complete federal control over Indians on
reservations. As the leader of an 1869 Smithsonian expedition down the
Colorado River reported,
The time has passed when it was necessary to buy peace. It only
remains to decide what should be done with [the Indians] for the
relief of the white people from their petty depredations, and from
the demoralizing influences accompanying the presence of savages
in civilized communities, and also for the best interests of the
Indians themselves?'
The solution hit upon was to assimilate the American Indians. A wave of
reformers calling themselves "Friends of the Indian" controlled federal Indian
policy from the last quarter of the nineteenth century through the first quarter
of the twentieth. The reformers fervently promoted the seductive doctrine that
the Indian problem would disappear not through guns but through the force
of Protestant American culture. In the words of Francis Prucha, "With an
ethnocentrism of frightening intensity, they resolved to do away with
Indianness and to preserve only the manhood of the individual Indian. There
would then be no more Indian problem because there would be no more
persons identifiable as Indians."'

21. See, e.g., Bob L. Blackburn, From Blood Revenge to the Lighthorsemen: Evolution of
Law Enforcement Institutions Among the Five Civilized Tribes to 1861, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
49, 62 (1980) (near-destruction of Seminole Indians).
22. PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 315-17.

23. 25 U.S.C. 71 (1994).
24. John Wesley Powell, From Warpath to Reservation, in THE INDIAN AND THE WHITE
1, at 374, 377-78.
25. Editor's Introduction to AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE
"FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN" 1880-1900, at I (Francis Paul Prucha ed. 1973) [hereinafter
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS].
MAN, supra note
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The first step in this process of "Americanization" was to remove lands
from communal tribal ownership into individual ownership by male heads of
families.' The first and major piece of legislation of the Assimilationist
Period, the Dawes or General Allotment Act of 1887,7 was intended to do
exactly that. The effects were devastating - of 138,000,000 acres Indians
held when the Dawes Act was passed, only 48,000,000 were left in 1934, and
nearly half of these were desert or semidesert.' The second step was cultural
education - Indian children were to be removed from their parents, purged
of the harmful influences of Indian language and religious belief, and
inculcated with belief systems that would allow them to finally disappear into
the white American mass. The Meriam Report of 1928, a surprisingly
contemporary work credited with ending the Assimilationist Period, later
condemned this practice for having devastated the Indian family in the same
way that allotment had devastated Indian land wealth.'
The case law reveals, however, that the Assimilationist Period was only
new in that the inculcation of non-Indian morality became a matter of
unabashedly coercive federal policy. This goal had undergirded state and
federal judicial decisions and federal treaties throughout the nineteenth
century. Perhaps as much as the physical upheavals caused by the federal
removal, reservation, and allotment policies, this moral vision had a profound
impact on gender roles in Indian society. For by the first quarter of the
nineteenth century, the promotion of a new, submissive role for women had
been elevated to an almost religious quest. The traditional role of Indian
women, which included a degree of political, legal, and marital autonomy
unknown to most white women, was a convenient target for this quest.
Interestingly, this development, like the Removal Period in federal Indian
policy, can be seen as the product of Jacksonian America. In the colonial
period, the shortage of women and need for productive labor from each
member of the family resulted in more equal legal status for women, and
included the ability to contract, own property, work (at least within the home),
and marry and divorce relatively easily." With the industrial expansion of
the 1830s, however, the proper sphere for woman shrank to the boundaries of

26. Id. at 6.
27. Ch. 199, §§ 1-2, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
28. Editor's Introductionto AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 25, at 10.
This material is also found in Frank Miller, Introduction to BROOKINGS INST., THE PROBLEM OF
INDIAN ADMINISTRATION vii (reprint 1971) (1928) [hereinafter PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION].

The Brookings study is commonly called the Merian Report after the director

of the study, Lewis Meriam.
29. PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION, supra note 28, at 575-76.

30. Gerda Lerner, The Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in the Status of Women in the Age
of Jackson. 1800-1840, in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN: TOWARD A NEW SOCIAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN WOMEN 182, 183 (Nancy F. Cott & Elizabeth Peck eds., 1979) [hereinafter HERITAGE
OF HER OWN].
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the home,3 and feminine idleness was transformed from a puritan sin to a
Jacksonian status symbol. 2
Barbara Welter discusses the elevation of the new woman in her seminal
article, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860."3 Analyzing books and
magazines aimed at a middle-class female audience, Welter documented the
emergence of a new vision of womanhood against the social and economic
instability of the nineteenth century. "In a society where values changed
frequently, where fortunes rose and fell with frightening rapidity," she writes,
"one thing at least remained the same - a true woman was a true woman,
wherever she was found. . . . It was a fearful obligation, a solemn
responsibility, which the nineteenth century American woman had - to
uphold the pillars of the temple with her frail white hand."'
Piety, chastity, and domesticity were the essential virtues of the true woman,
and confinement and dedication to the home was the both the purpose of and
the means to these qualities. To engage in activities outside the home whether work, nondomestic education, or recreation - was to risk arousing
sexual attention and forgetting one's submissive role. 5 Moreover, it was within
the home that a woman's true mission was fulfilled. "From her home woman
performed her task of bringing men back to God.... 'the domestic fireside was
the great guardian of society against the excesses of human passions.""' She
performed this godly task through devotion to the newfound "science of
housekeeping" and to the desires of her male relatives, ensuring "that brothers,
husbands and sons would not go elsewhere in search of a good time."37
While these changes affected all women, Indian women were perhaps
particularly ill-suited to conform with the emerging ideal, and particularly
likely to be condemned for falling short rather than idolized for conforming.
For even more than working class white women, Indian women did not fit the
role of passive creatures devoted to the domestic comforts of the men with
whom they lived." But to the extent that Indian leaders desired to emulate
white Americans, some of them came to expect Indian women to conform to
the ideals of the cult of domesticity. As the members of the growing middle
class could establish their still-insecure status through adherence to the

31. Id. at 184.
32. Id. at 191.
33. Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966),
reprinted in PROBLEMS IN VOMEN'S HISTORY, supra note 11, at 115.
34. Id. at 151-52, reprintedin PROBLEMS IN WVOMEN'S HISTORY, supra note 11, at 115.

35. For example, one magazine cautioned young ladies to "read not out of the same book;
let not your eagerness to see anything induce you to place your head close to another person's."
Another approvingly quoted a young wife as saying a woman ought not "feel and act for herself."
Id. at 117-18.
36. Id. at 118.
37. Id. at 119.

38. See infra notes 84-112 and accompanying text.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

domestic ideal,39 so among more wealthy Indian tribes "true womanhood
came to be associated with civilization and progress. Any challenge to the
precepts of the cult of true womanhood could be interpreted as a reversion to
savagery."' Theda Perdue has examined the ways that this ideal influenced
the role of women among the Cherokees, perhaps the tribe quickest to adapt
to white civilization, in the first half of the century. "Of all the southern
tribes," she concludes, "the Cherokees provide the sharpest contrast between
the traditional role of women and the role they were expected to assume in
the early nineteenth century. 4
Of course the influence of the emerging ideal was not only internal. Indian
women provided a convenient contrast with the demure "true" woman. Three
paintings of Pocahontas illustrate the changes in the popular image of the
Indian woman. A 1616 portrait painted while Pocahontas was in England
bears th. caption, "daughter to the mighty Prince Powhatan Emperour of
Attanoughkomouck al's Virginia converted and baptized in the Christian
faith."4 In accord with this royal description, she is painted as a young
woman with a slight smile, encased in heavy royal seventeenth century
clothing that completely hides the shape of her body. In the early eighteenth
century, a young woman at a Massachusetts finishing school pictured
Pocahontas as young and virginal, clothed in a simple dress, hair neatly pulled
back, holding a single flower in her tiny hand.43 In the nineteenth century,
by contrast, Robert Matthew Sully would depict Pocahontas with wild, loose
hair, bare neck and shoulders, and a thick fur draped over her breasts. This
Pocahontas smiles seductively at the viewer." Over a period of three
centuries, Pocahontas has been transformed from princess to virgin to
primitive siren, reflecting the change from perceiving Indian women as native
royalty 10 seeing them as the symbol of everything a good woman should not
be.
The transformation of the feminine ideal had legal influence on Indian
women as well. The concepts of "civilized" marriage that state courts would
impose on Indian women were the products of the vision of marriage and
family established during this era. Although nineteenth century state courts
almost uniformly treat the Indian informality of marriage and divorce as
foreign and barbaric, marriage by consent had been the rule in England

39. Christine Stansell provides a thorough examination of this theme of the class relations
that underlay the cult of domesticity in CHRISTINE STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS
IN NEW YORK, 1789-1860 (1986).
40. Theda Perdue, Southern Indians and the Cult of True Womanhood, in THE WED OF
SOURHENi SOCIAL RELATIONS 35 (Walter J.Fraser et al. eds., 1985). reprinted in PROBLEMS IN
WOMEN'S HISTORY, supra note 11, at 132, 137.
41. Id. at 47, reprinted in PROBLEMS IN WOMEN'S HISTORY, supra note 11, at 136.
42. THE INDIAN AND THE WHITE MAN, supra note 1, at plate 3.
43. Id. at plate 4.
44. Id. at plate 5.
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throughout most of the eighteenth century.45 In America, it was not until the
nineteenth century that state regulation of marriage and divorce was
Moreover, most states did not enact laws prohibiting
established.
miscegenation until the Civil War period.47 But soon courts adopted these
fairly recent developments as integral to white civilization and their absence
as symbolic of Indian barbarism.
The middle class "true woman" also directly asserted her influence over
Indian culture. Such women took an ever increasing role in reform and
charity movements appropriate for their gender. Welter describes this as a
consequence of the ideology of domesticity, stating that "if woman was so
very little less than the angels, she should surely take a more active part in
running the world, especially since men were making such a hash of
things"' and Stansell declares this a way for bourgeois women to "refine[]
their own sense of themselves as social and spiritual superiors .... "'
Indeed, although the cult of domesticity flourished in the Northeast, Stansell
has suggested that women traveling to the frontiers were particularly eager to
establish a separate domestic sphere in the face of the nonconventional
activities pioneer women had to assume.' Whatever the reason, middle class
women suddenly took up the cause of the Indian in great numbers, seeking
to inculcate their vision of the restorative nuclear home in their less fortunate
sisters.
This undisguised meddling with Indian culture and property was not
brought to a halt until 1934, when Congress adopted the Indian
Reorganization Act under the leadership of Commissioner of Indian Affairs
John Collier. The act finally repealed the General Allotment Act and espoused
tribal self-governance in accord with Indian traditions and culture. Tribes
adopting the act incorporated and enacted tribal constitutions under the
guidance of the BIA. There are many questions about whether the IRA was
about Indian tribes' vision of themselves or about Collier's own vision for
them.' Less well known, however, is how the previous century affected the
Indian vision of women by the time they were, supposedly, again allowed to

45. Henry H. Foster, Indian and Common Law Marriages,3 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 83, 84-85
(1975).
46. Id, at 86.
47. Id. at 87 n.42.
48. Welter, supra note 33, at 174, reprinted in PROBLEMS IN VOMEN'S HISTORY, supranote
11, at 122.
49. STANSELL, supra note 39, at xii.
50. Johnny Faragher & Christine Stansell, Women and their Familieson the OverlandTrail
to California and Oregon, 1842-1867, in HERITAGE OF HER OWN, supra note 30, at 246.
51. Francis Prucha, for example, has written that "despite the high-sounding rhetoric of
Indian self-determination, it was a paternalistic program for Indians, who were expected to accept
it willy-nilly." PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 945. Two of the largest and best organized Indian
nations rejected the act in its entirety: the Navajo, id. at 965, and the New York Iroquois,
LAURENCE M. HAUPTMAN, THE IROQUOIS AND THE NEw DEAL 9 (1981).
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implement that vision. The rest of the article will begin to answer this
question.
III. Federaland State Governments and Indian Women: As Themselves, as
Mothers, and as Wives
A. The Beginning: Ladiga's Heirs and Indian Women in Their Own Right
In coming to the courts, Indian women confronted a system that was
unaccustomed and often resistant to acknowledging the political, domestic,
and economic power that they often held. The result was decisions that
stripped women of this power, sometimes in the name of civilization and
sometimes in the name of the law.
This process is exemplified in the earliest case I discuss, reported in a
trilogy of opinions concerning an action brought by Creek woman Sally
Ladiga and her children against the white man who purchased title to their
land.' The three opinions turn on the question of whether Ladiga, the
husbandless mother and grandmother of many, could be considered the head
of a family for purposes of land distribution. Between the federally appointed
Indian commissioners, the Alabama courts, and the United States Supreme
Court, it took twenty years to conclusively decide that she was. At this point,
however, the Alabama Supreme Court declared that Ladiga's heirs could not
carry on the action in the now deceased plaintiffs name.
Sally Ladiga was enrolled as a Creek Indian when the Treaty of New
Echota was enacted in 1832. Under the treaty, Indian heads of families were
to be allotted 320 acres of land to live on and cultivate. Local federally
appointed "locating agents" decided who was an Indian and who was the head
of a family and allotted heads of families the land on which they resided and
had made improvements. When Ladiga was enrolled, she had a cabin and a
cultivated field on her land, had raised a family of several children, but had
no husband of record.' The only people recorded as living with her were
another Indian woman, Sarah Letter, and a boy named Ar-chee-chee.' In
spite of evidence that Ladiga bought clothes for Ar-chee-chee, 5 as well as
conflicting evidence that he was Ladiga's orphaned grandson, the locating
agent found that Ladiga was not the head of a family and was not entitled to
a half section of landY
52. The case was first reported by the Alabama Supreme Court as Rowland v. Ladiga, 9
Port. 488 (Ala. 1839) (Ladiga 1). It was reversed and remanded by the United States Supreme
Court as Ladiga v. Rowland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 581 (1844) (Ladiga 11). It was finally disposed
of as Rowland v. Ladiga's Heirs, 21 Ala. 9 (1852) (Ladiga 111).
53. Ladiga 111, 21 Ala. at 11.
54. d. at 11.
55. Id. at 13.

56. Ladiga II, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 585. There is some suggestion in this opinion that Sarah
Letter was her grandchild as well. Id.
57. Ladiga 111, 21 Ala. at 12. The opinion notes that the agent apparently was influenced
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Ladiga remained on the land until 1833 or 1834, when a white man named
Smith entered her land and took over her cabin and field. Although she then
left to stay with relatives, she made "continuous and repeated applications"58
to different locating agents to be recognized as the head of a family and given
the right to remain. Despite repeated denials, she kept returning until a soldier
removed her from a shelter on the edges of the land in 1837 or 1838."9 This
was her last recorded attempt to return. Armed troops then forced her to
emigrate to the newly established Indian Territory in Arkansas.' Like so
many of those who walked this "Trail of Tears," she probably died during the
journey. None of those writing the opinions actually knew what happened to
her - the record
said simply that she "never reached the banks of the
Mississippi.""6
In the first published opinion on the claim, the Alabama Supreme Court
declared that its hands were tied. It found that Ladiga's right of possession
depended not on whether she was indeed the head of a family but solely on
her allotment of the land by the government.62 The violation of justice, in
essence, had not been with them: "If the United States should so far forget the
obligations of good faith, as to grant these lands to other persons ... the
Indians are remediless in courts of law."'
The United States Supreme Court reversed in 1844. The Court noted that
Sally Ladiga had lived on the land for many years and had raised "a
numerous family of children" there.' Justice Baldwin, writing for the Court,
firmly stated that it was the intent of the Indian and federal signatories to
include Indians like Ladiga as allottees: "We cannot seriously discuss the
question, whether a grandmother and her grandchildren compose a family, in
the meaning of that word in the treaty, it must shock the common sense of all
mankind to even doubt it."' The Court also dismissed the defendant's
argument that Ladiga had abandoned her right to the land by leaving it within
the five years stipulated by the treaty: "She has not slept on her rights, but
from 1832 to 1837 has made continuous and repeated applications to the
government officers to assert her rights to said land, and through them to the
government itself in 1837. She has never abandoned her claim, but has
insisted on her rights under the treaty."' The opinion expressed dismay that
the Alabama court had suggested anything different and cited with approval

by the requests of white settlers in the region. Id.
58. Ladiga II, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 585.
59. Ladiga II, 21 Ala. at 12.

60. Ladiga 11, 43 (2 How.) U.S. at 585.
61. Ladiga II,21 Ala. at 12.
62. Ladiga 1,9 Port. at491.
63. Id.at 492.

64. Ladiga II,
43 U.S. (2 How.) at583.

65. Id.at 590.
66. Id.
at 591.
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the contrary holdings and reasoning of two opinions from Tennessee and one
from Alabama
(The opinion did not note that these decisions were
distinguishable in that the plaintiffs were all men.)
The man who at that time claimed ownership of the land won the first trial
on remand. The action was then removed out of the county where the land
was located. Upon the new trial, the plaintiffs won. Before this point,
however, Sally Ladiga had died, and her children and grandchildren had
continued the action as her heirs.' Reviewing the decision anew, the
Alabama Supreme Court stated that the Supreme Court's decision was correct
and that to characterize Ladiga's departure from the land as a voluntary
abandonment would be "to allow lawless force to defeat individual rights."70
The court spent several pages explaining that the heirs of an Indian allottee
might sue to enforce a decedent's right to the allotted land.' Finding,
however, that the only evidence that the plaintiffs were indeed Ladiga's heirs
was a "common rumor amongst the tribe of the Creek Indians, that the
plaintiffs were the children and grandchildren of Sally Ladiga" and that no
proof of this was offered to the jury" the court felt "constrained" to reverse
the judgment and remand for another trialV
The three opinions bring together several themes which recur throughout
the cases of the century to follow. First, in contrast to the assumptions
behind laws like that at issue in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,74 the
Ladiga opinions compellingly present the commitment of an Indian woman
to remain on her tribal lands long after her male family had gone. A second
theme is the handwashing the Alabama courts undergo to justify their
decisions. They do not like it, they imply, but federal/state/Indian law has
constrained the result. In this case, as discussed above, the Supreme Court
decision and the dissent in Ladiga III show that the "constraint" is not,

67. Id.
68. See Comet v. Winton's Lessee, 8 Tenn (2 Yer.) 143 (1826); Jones' Lessee v. Evans,
13 Tenn (5 Yer.) 323 (1833); Jones v. Inge, 5 Port. 327 (Ala. 1837). The opinion in Jones v.
Inge, revealingly, was written by Judge Goldthwaite, author of the first Ladiga opinion.
69. Ladiga 111, 21 Ala. at 10-11.
70. Id. at 30.
71. Id. at 28-32.
72. Id. at 31.
73. Id. at 34. Justice Phelan in dissent noted that although there was nothing in the record
stating specifically that the jury had been instructed that they had to find that the defendants were
Ladiga's heirs, the bill of exceptions read that "other charges" were given. Id. at 35. The court's
reversal violated both the canon that the bill of exceptions should be construed in light most
favorable to the regularity of judgment and the doctrine that a party seeking reversal must clearly
show error. Id. Cast in this light, the court's decision was hardly a reaction to constraint.
74. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). The Santa ClaraPueblo decision justified the rule by claiming that
children of Santa Claran women were more likely to be raised as cultural outsiders. Resnik, supra
note 4, at 717. See supra note 4 for cites to some articles discussing Martinez, and infra notes
266-72 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the case.
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perhaps, as inexorable as the courts suggest. The issues of proof regarding
the family relationship between Sally Ladiga and Ar-chee-chee and Sarah
Letter, and that between Sally and the children and grandchildren suing in
her name, raise another continuing element in these cases: because the
traditions of many of the tribes involved were oral and customary, the courts
often acknowledge that they only have evidence of limited probative force.
Decisions whether to act on such evidence often appear politically
motivated." The opinions also highlight the extent to which the law that
affected Indians - particularly Indian women - was not only federal law.
The manifestations of the "Indian problem" were at the most immediate level
local ones: here, the non-Indian population of Alabama agitated for even
more of the fertile, prosperous land of Southeastern Cherokee country 6 than
became available after the Indian removal of 1832. Significantly, the federal
court was the only one to note how valuable the land was; the land in
question was worth over 3,000 dollars and had earned 2,000 dollars in rent
since Sally Ladiga was ejected in 1832.'
Despite the reversal by the Supreme Court, the assumption that a woman
was not the head of the family, and even the attempts to displace women who
acted as the heads of families, were both reflections of a policy which appears
in federal enactments of the period. Some treaties were as explicit as the 1861
Treaty with the Pottawatomie, which declared that when the President
determined "that any adults, being males and heads of families . . . are
sufficiently intelligent and prudent to control their affairs and interests," he
might convey those Indians, land to them in fee simple and they would
thereafter be citizens7 Though less explicit, an article inserted in all of the

75. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 27 F. 950 (D. Ark 1847) (holding that court didn't
have jurisdiction to punish murderer of child based on rumor that mother of victim was Indian);
Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48, 50 (1845) ("All of the testimony in relation to rights of husband
and wife, under Choctaw law, may have been of a disreputable or doubtful nature."); Turner v.

Fish, 28 Miss. 306 (1854) (stating that court will rely on Choctaw customs then assuming that
government action was appropriate because no evidence of Choctaw customs).
76. David Brown, an educated Cherokee man, described the Cherokee land seven years
before the treaty:
This country is well watered; abundant springs of pure water are found in
every part. A range of majestic and lofty mountains stretch themselves across the
nation. The northern part of the nation is hilly and mountainous. In the southern
and western parts, there are extensive and fertile plains, covered partly with tall
trees, through which beautiful streams of water glide. These plains furnish
immense pasturage, and numberless herds of cattle are dispersed over them.
Horses are plenty ... [N]umerous flocks of sheep, goats, and swine, cover the
valleys and hills.
David Brown, Letter of September 2, 1825, in THOMAS L. M'KENNEY, MEMOIRS, OFFICIAL AND
PERSONAL WITH SKETCHES OF TRAVELS AMONG THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN INDIANS 37
(1846) [hereinafter M'KENNEY, MEMOIRS].
77. Ladiga v. Rowland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 581, 584 (1844) (Ladiga11).
78. Treaty with the Pottawatomie, art. 3, 12 Stat. 1191, 1192 (1861), reprintedin2 INDIAN
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major treaties with the Indians of 1868 clearly envisions assimilation through
male heads of families:
If any individual ... being the head of a family, shall desire to
commence farming, he shall have the privileges to select ... a

tract of land within the reservation not exceeding three hundred
and twenty acres [which shall be] held in the exclusive possession
of the person selecting it, and of his family. 9
The gender-specific language was deliberate. Within the same article, such
treaties used both male and female pronouns to refer to those who were not
heads of families and were entitled to only one quarter of the land that male
heads of families were entitled to: "Any person over eighteen years of age,
not being the head of a family, may in like manner select and cause to be
certified to him, or her.., a quantity of land not exceeding eighty acres in
extent. .

. ."

The 1887 Dawes Act also initially excluded married women

from allotments of tribal land. Only after much protest was it modified in
1891.1
Such legislation was often motivated by a desire to improve the lives of
both the Indian people and of the women themselves. As expressed here by
a prominent "Friend of the Indian," it was believed that this would improve
the lot of both these "less-favored" women and of their race'as a whole:
The Indian woman has so far been only a beast of burden....
The Indian wife was treated by her husband alternately with
animal fondness, and with the cruel brutality of the slave-driver.
Nothing will be more apt to raise the Indians in the scale of
civilization than to stimulate their attachment to permanent homes,
and it is the woman that must make the atmosphere and form the
attraction of the home.8
AFFAIRS: LAWS & TREATIES 825 (Charles J. Kappler ed., photo. reprint 1975) (1904) (emphasis
added). The treaty was amended in 1867 to include female heads of families. Treaty with the
Pottawatomie, art. 6, 15 Stat. 531 (1867), reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES,
supra, at 970.
79. See, e.g., Treaty with the Cheyenne & Arapahoe, art. 6, 15 Stat. 593, 595 (1867)
(emphasis added). Virtually identical language is found in the Treaty with the Ute, art. 7, 15 Stat.
619, 620-21 (1868), Treaty with the Sioux, art. 6, 15 Star. 635, 637 (1868), Treaty with the
Crows, art. 6, 15 Stat. 649, 650-51 (1868), Treaty with the Northern Cheyenne & Arapaho, art.
3, 15 Stat. 655, 656 (1868), Treaty with the Navajo, art. 5, 15 Stat. 667, 668 (1868), and Treaty
with the Shoshonees & Bannacks, art. 6, 15 Stat. 673, 675 (1868). These treaties assume a
significant role in contemporary litigation, because three years later Congress passed legislation
banning further treaty making with the Indian tribes. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat.
566, 566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 71 (1994)).
80. Id. (emphasis added). The same treaties also provide that they could not be modified
unless executed by a majority of the "adult male" Indians of the tribe. See, e.g., Treaty with the
Sioux, art. 6,15 Stat. 635, 637 (1868).
81. Lacey, supra note 4, at 353 n.123; see Dawes Act §§ 1-2, ch. 383,26 Stat. 794, 794-95.
82. Carl Schurz, Present Aspects of the Indian Problem, 133 N. AM. REv. 1 (1881),
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Similarly, William Strong, a former Supreme Court Justice, spoke against
allotting land to married women under the impending Dawes Act: "I want the
Indians brought together in families. There can never be any civilization
without families. I would have the head of the family have the land, and have
it descend to his wife and children."83
No less than the (perhaps more disingenuous) holdings of the Alabama
Supreme Court in Ladiga, however, such well-meaning policy makers were
motivated by a misunderstanding of the role of the Indian woman within
many tribes. Women were almost uniformly responsible for a greater share
of the productive labor of American Indian communities than their white
nineteenth century counterparts.' Ironically, despite the frustrated attempts
of federal officials to turn Indian men into farmers, it was women who had
responsibility for cultivating the land in most American tribes.85 White
observers and federal officials rejected such female participation in what they
conceived of as the male sphere of work as a sign of ignoble savagery and of
the debasement of the Indian male.'
These traditional responsibilities, however, gave Indian women a degree
of autonomy unknown to their white counterparts. Women controlled what
food would be grown, how it would be prepared, what clothes, shoes, and
blankets would be madeY Sitting Bull, the powerful Chief of the Sioux,

reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 25, at 20. Similarly, a policy
statement of the Lake Mohonk conference urged lifting women "out of that position of servility
and degradation which most of them now occupy onto a place where their husbands and men
generally will treat them with the same gallantry and respect which is accorded their more
favored white sisters." LAKE MOHONK FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN CONFERENCE SEVENTH ANNUAL
REPORT 19 (1890), quoted in Lacey, supra note 4, at 366.
83. Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference 32-34 (1885),
reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 25, at 40.
84. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Feminist JurisprudenceSymposium, Gendered Checks
and Balances: Understandingthe Legacy of White Patriarchyin an American Indian Cultural
Context, 24 GA. L. REv. 1019, 1030-31 (1990) (discussing different understandings by whites and
Indians of relatively greater share of work for which Indian women were responsible); Lacey,
supra note 4, at 333.
85. See, e.g., Williams, supranote 84, at 1041 (regarding women's responsibility for farming
among the Iroquois); Perdue, supra note 40, at 36, reprintedin PROBLEMS INWOMEN'S HISTORY,
supra note 11, at 133 ("[Traditional southern Indian] women farmed in a society that depended
primarily on agriculture for subsistence [and] performed most of the manual labor with men
assisting only in clearing fields and planting com.").
86. Williams, supra note 84, at 1029-30; Perdue, supra note 40, at 36, reprinted in
PROBLEMS INWOMEN'S HISTORY, supranote 11, at 133. A bizarre example of this resistance to
"nontraditional" labor by Indian women is the Bureau of Indian Affairs' response to participation
by women in the ritual killing of rationed beeves: in an executive directive, the Commissioner
specified that killing and butchering was to be done by men. H.R. EXEC. DOC. No. 5 1-1, at 166
(1890).
87. See Joseph J. Thompson, Law Amongst the Aborigines of the Mississippi Valley, 6 ILL.
L.Q. 204,206 (1924) (citing I HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIANS 308 (Frederick W. Hodge ed.,
1910) (entry titled "Property and Property Right," written by Alice C. Fletcher)).
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well recognized the power that productive labor gave women when he
pleaded with a white woman administrating the Dawes Act. "[T]ake pity on
my women.... The young men can be like the white men, can till the soil,
supply the food and clothing. They will take the work out of the hands of
women. And the women .. .will be stripped of all which gave them
power."",

Women's task-based responsibility translated into property rights. In
contrast to the white nineteenth century woman whose property transferred by
law to her husband upon marriage, it was a "maxim" that among the Indians,
everything belonged to the women, "except the Indian's hunting implements
and war implements, even the game the Indian brought home on his back."8
The Cherokees memorialized this understanding in their earliest written
laws.'
Indian women also exercised relatively greater control over the descent
of property and the family name. The commonplace that all Indian tribes
were matrilocal - or that couples lived with the woman's family - and
matrilineal - or that kinship was traced and inherited from the woman is probably somewhat overstated. The Navajo and Iroquois were matrilineal
and matrilocal,9" the Cheyenne and Arapaho were generally matrilocal, the

88. Quoted in Sara Deutsch, Coming Together, Coming Apart - Women's History and the
West, 41 MONT. MAG. W. HIsT. 58, 59-60 (1991).
89. Thompson, supra note 87, at 210. The passage quoted above provides an excellent
example of the difficulty of relying on outsiders' accounts of gendered Indian customs and their
frequently internally contradictory nature. Within the same paragraph, the author writes that
"'[p]roperly speaking, the husband is the master, the wife the slave.'' Id. The earlier statement,
however, has far more corroboration in the literature (and, incidentally, better supports the
author's point). See, e.g,, Carol Devens, Separate Confrontations: Genderas a Factorin Indian
Adaptation to European Colonization in New France, 38 AM. Q. 461 (1986), reprinted in
PROBLEMS IN WOMEN'S HISTORY, supra note 11, at 25 (stating that Canadian Indian women
controlled apportionment and distribution of meat that men brought home); Perdue, supra note
40, at 37, reprintedin PROBLEMS INWOMEN'S HISTORY, supranote I1,at 134 (stating that home,
buildings, garden plots, and sections of common field which the family used were owned by
southern Indian wife); Williams, supra note 84, at 1041 (stating that Iroquois women owned
longhouses, agricultural fields, and produce and surplus from fields while men owned only their
knives and guns); see also ROBERT H. LowiE, INDIANS OF THE PLAINS 80 (1963) (stating that
despite "bride price," Plains Indian wife was not a chattel). A somewhat different formulation
existed among the Navajo, who'declared during the marriage ceremony that each spouse became
the property of the other. Zion & Zion, supra note 4, at 412.
90. See LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION: ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL AT VARIOUS PERIODS

142-43 (1995 Scholarly Resources, Inc. reprint) (1852) [hereinafter LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE
NATION]. Even in this rare case where Indian woman's property rights were committed to writing,
however, the Tennessee Supreme Court ignored their existence. See Morgan v. McGhee, 24 Tenn.
(5 Humph.) 13 (1844) (discussed at infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text).
91. James W, Zion and Elsie B. Zion contend that both matrilocality and polygamy were
traditional ways of ensuring that husbands would not abuse their wives. Zion & Zion, supra note
4, at 414. Robert Lowie made the same claim regarding matrilocality among tribes of the plains.
LOWIE, supra note 89, at 82.
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Pamunkey were matrilineal, but the Blackfoot and many of the Great Lakes
tribes were patrilineal and patrilocal, and the Crow and Sioux appear to
have been either.' Nor were tribes perfect models of feminist culture. The
double standard, for example, was alive and well among the Sioux and
some other Plains tribes - adolescent girls spent their nights tied to their
beds to preserve their chastity,93 and unfaithful wives might have their
noses cut off or be otherwise mutilated to discourage infidelity.' But while
tribes might differ in the amount of autonomy given to women, women
typically exercised legal and political powers that sat very uneasily with
judges of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The reactions of New York state courts to the descent practices of the
various Iroquois tribes evidence this unease. Scholars frequently cite the
Iroquois - a confederacy of the Seneca, Mohawk, Cayuga, Tuscarora,
Onondaga, and Oneida tribes - as a tribal culture in which women wielded
great power. The Iroquois were organized socially, politically, and culturally
by a matrilineal clan system. Property, titles, and names descended through
the clan of one's mother. Although chiefs were typically men, clan mothers
in consultation with other women of the clan selected new chiefs and had the
power to impeach them. All titles, rights, and property descended through
one's mother's clan through a Dead Feast, a ceremony feast held ten days after
death in which the clan mother presided over the distribution of the decedent's
propertyi In an early New York state case, Dole v. Irish, the court
reaffirmed the sovereignty of the Seneca law over descent of Seneca
property.' But when the New York courts were confronted with the

92. See also Resnik, supra note 4, at 705-06 (discussing conflicting evidence of whether
Santa Clara Pueblo were matrilocal, matrilineal, patrilocal or patrilineal and questioning
significance of such evidence).
93. ROYAL B. HASSRICK, THE Sioux: LIFE AND CUSTOMS OF A VARRIOR SOCIETY 45
(1964); PIERRE-ANTOINE TABEAU, NARRATIVE OF LOISEL'S EXPEDITION TO THE UPPER MISSOURI
178-81 (Annie H. Abel ed., Rose A. Wright trans., Univ. of Okla. Press, 1939), reprintedin THE
INDIAN AND THE WHITE MAN, supra note 1, at 92-93.
94. HASSRICK, supranote 93, at 48; TABEAU, supra note 93, reprinted in THE INDIAN AND
THE WHITE MAN, supra note 1, at 91.
95. Williams, supranote 84, at 1039-40. Because chieftainships were inherited matrilineally,
the king's son never succeeded him. Rather the next in line was a son of one of the king's sisters
chosen by the head matron after consultation with the women of her group. In the absence of a
son, the Tuscarora Iroquois of North Carolina had been reported to choose a daughter. I F. ROY
JOHNSON, THE TUscARORAS, MYTHOLOGY, MEDICINE, CULTURE 228 (1963).
96. Dole v. Irish, 2 Barb. 639 (N.Y. 1848) (upholding right of inheritor given property
through Dead Feast over that of another granted letters of administration over property). The
court there stated,
We have not attempted to extend our laws to their domestic relations, or to
regulate the manner of their acquiring, holding or conveying property among
themselves. We have never applied our doctrines of descent or distribution to their
property, nor subjected them to our laws relating to wills, intestacy or
administration ....
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gendered aspects of that method of property distribution, they tended to reach
different results.
97
The shift began with Peters v. Tallchief,
a case involving Tuscarora
Indians, who, although Iroquois, had moved to New York from North
Carolina in the eighteenth century. The court found that it was competent to
intervene because the Tuscarora "are farther advanced in civilization and their
tribal relations less intact than that of the larger reservation."" Then, after
stating that the record contained almost nothing regarding the Tuscarora, the
court declared that "[tihis is not a case where the petitioner's right of action
contravenes some custom or law of the tribe to which she belongs.""
Confident of the advanced civilization of these North Carolina Iroquois, and
relying on their assumptions regarding Tuscarora customs, the court found that
the existing will was the valid method of distributing property.
There, the daughter of the decedent ejected his daughter-in-law, Linnie
Peters, from her father's land after her brother, Peters' husband, died. Perhaps
the specter of a widow with an infant daughter cast out of her marital home
inspired the court's break with the precedent of Dole v. Irish. It seems clear
that when another New York court rejected the validity of distribution of
property by Dead Feast two years later, the court fancied itself in the role of
protector of the hapless woman.1" In Hatch v. Luckman, Thomas Skye, a
Tonawanda Indian, had conveyed his lands to his son-in-law before his death.
At the Ten Day Feast after his death, however, Skye's illegitimate son and
three nephews were appointed administrators of Skye's estate. Because the
mother of his daughter Phoebe Hatch was Cattaraugus rather than Tonawanda,
"the rights of his legitimate daughter and natural heir at law . . . were
ignored."'' " In response Hatch had herself appointed administrator in
Surrogates Court. The question was whether the surrogate court had
jurisdiction.
What was important for the reviewing court was that "the Indians of this
State have advanced in intelligence, education, and civilization, and we can
see no reason why the common law of the land should not apply to and
govern them and their affairs .... ", The court justified overruling Iroquois
customary law with the "advancement" of the Iroquois people. They had
become too civilized, in other words, for their own law.
In holding that the common law of paternal lines of descent should apply,
the court hearkened to what it saw as the first incursion into the sovereignty

Id. at 642.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

106 N.Y.S. 64 (App. Div. 1907).
Id. at 312.
Id.
See Hatch v. Luckman, 118 N.Y.S. 689 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
Id. at 691.
Id. at 695.
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of the New York Indians. In the early nineteenth century, the court recounted,
an Indian woman was tried and convicted on charges of sorcery by an Indian
court in Buffalo. Two young Indians were directed to carry out her death
sentence. When she was bound to the stake, the executors faltered, and an
Indian named Soo-non-gize, or Tommy Jemmy, seized a tomahawk and sank
it into the woman's skull."n Jemmy contended that in killing the woman he
was carrying out judgment of the Indian court, so he could not be prosecuted.
The court disagreed, and the state legislature codified its decision in ch. 204
of the laws of 1822, which stated that trying and punishing any person was
within the jurisdiction of the state."n
Cast in the light of this history, the Tallchief and Hatch decisions seem
part of a tradition of protecting Indian women against the injustice of their
barbaric communities. Examination of the facts show that in both cases the
courts were stepping in where the tribes might well have: the ejectment of
Peters was not sanctioned by any tribal authority, and the practice under
which Hatch had been disinherited had been abolished by the Tonawanda. 5
But the precedent established was soon used to prevent Onondaga women
from asserting the rights of their husbands and daughters after their deaths.
In Hill v. Shafty,'" the court found that an Onondaga woman assigned all
of her husband's property and goods at a Dead Feast was not his
administratrix such that she could maintain a wrongful death action on his
behalf. The court relied on the fact that Martha Hill was not a duly appointed
administratrix as required by state law."n The court ignored Hill's claim that
she could not be appointed administrator by the surrogate court because it did
not have jurisdiction over her as an Indian; it was unmoved by its recognition
that "plaintiff is caught between the millstones and deprived of a chance to
present her claim to a jury, simply because she is an Indian, instead of a
white woman."" Rather, it found that to allow Hill to maintain her action
would be to discriminate against the white woman who claimed the right to
act as her husband's administratrix simply because she was his heir." "It
is true," Judge Edgcombe wrote, "that this court is open to plaintiff the same

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Although the Tonawanda had declared that the Dead Feast was not a valid method of
distributing property, abolishing the practice by resolution of council in 1888, the court declared
this unimportant. Id. at 696.
106. 201 N.Y.S. 29 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
107. Under section 130 of New York's Decedent Estate Law, "[tlhe executor or administrator
duly appointed in this state, or in any other state, territory or district of the United States, or in
any foreign country, of a decedent who has left him or her surviving a husband, wife, or next of
kin, may maintain an action" for wrongful death. Id. at 30.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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as if she were a citizen. Indian Law, § 5. But the statute does not give the
plaintiff any greater right than it gives its own citizens. .. ."'
The issue came back before the court two years later, when Susan Crouse,
also Onondaga, sought to maintain a wrongful death suit against the railways
on behalf of her daughter, Della Bucktooth. " ' Crouse, like Hill, had held a
dead feast within ten days of the death of her daughter. There, however, she
was proclaimed the administratrix of her estate, was appointed such legally,
and was given a letter of administration. The court still found that Crouse was
not the personal representative contemplated by decedent law. The opinion
stated that Hatch v. Luckman had held "that the 'dead feast' according to
Indian custom, has never been recognized in law as having any legal
existence in this state, and that its attempt to administer and divide the lands
and property of the deceased, as to which its power in any event must be
limited, was wholly without warrant of law, and void."". The abrogation of
Iroquois customary law that began in Talichief and Luckman in the name of
protecting the hapless woman, had become a precedent to deny both Indian
law and the rights of Indian women formal recognition.
In like manner, regardless of good intentions the effect of such decisions
and laws was to diminish the autonomy and sources of independent economic
support which separated Indian women from their non-Indian counterparts. As
a result, the status of Indian women would increasingly be derived from their
relationships to their husbands and children. I proceed now to those cases
which decide the nature of those relationships.
B. Indian Women as Wives and Mothers: Intermarriageand Beyond
White men soon filled the gaps left by the removal of the women as legal
heads of Indian families. Two years after the Alabama Supreme Court
decided Ladiga III, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided that a white
husband of an Indian woman was the head of a family under the Treaty of
Dancing Rabbit Creek."' Here, the white man whose treaty rights were
affirmed exhibited none of the commitment of Sally Ladiga and her family

110. IdL at31.
I1. Crouse v. New York State Rys., 209 N.Y.S. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
112. Id. at 266. Eight years later, the same court partially reversed its position, holding that
only wills ratified at a Dead Feast were valid for the disposition of Onondaga property. Lyons
v. Lyons, 268 N.Y.S. 84 (Sup. Ct. 1933). The judicial reversal might well have bein the product
of the new federal policy that Indians were to be given sovereignty over their own affairs. In
holding, however, that Iva Lyons might be ejected from her husband's land, the court displayed
its belief that it was abandoning the Iroquois to the mercies of a barbaric practice. The court
described the decedent Emmet Lyons as a "member of Beaver Clan ... what is known to the
white man as a pagan," id. at 85, and described the clan mother as "really the president and
dictator of the affairs of the clan," id.
113. Turnerv. Fish, 28 Miss. 306 (1854) (construing Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, 7 Stat.
340 (1830)).
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to remaining on tribal land. Freeman Smith, the white husband of Choctaw
woman Eliza Smith, sold his allotment within three years of receiving it, and
the successors to title challenged his right to it against that of Eliza and her
children."' The court first stated that it would rely on Choctaw custom to
decide the issue:
When a white man married a woman who was a member of the
Indian nation, and adopted her domicil, whether he became the
head of the family or not, must depend upon the law or custom
regulating the marital rights of the parties in such a case. And this
is what we presume the treaty means, when it speaks of 'the head
of a family;' one who is so in the Choctaw sense of the term, or
according to the usages and customs of the nation." 5
The record was silent, however, as to whether a white man could be the head
of a Choctaw family under Choctaw law. The court therefore declared that
it had to presume in favor of the government's action in locating Smith as the
allottee of the land." 6 Although relatively few Indian women married white
men, intermarriage was the context in which many of the conflicts concerning
Indian women were litigated, and the law regarding Indian marriages, both in
terms of allocation of legal status and in terms of the recognition of Indian
custom, was often first developed in conflicts arising from Indian-white
marriages. It is necessary, therefore, to understand the gendered nature of
intermarriage to understand the transformations of the legal status of Indian
women during this time.
1. A Not So Brief Note on Intermarriage
Marriages between white men and Indian women dominate the non-Indian
popular and historical consciousness. In his sardonic debunking of popular
perceptions of the American Indians, CusterDied For Your Sins, Vine Deloria
writes that as an official with the National Congress of American Indians,
although "it was a rare day when some white didn't visit my office and
proudly proclaim that he or she was of Indian descent," all but one of these
claimed Indian ancestors were women."' He explains this "Indian
grandmother complex" as a product of the different racial connotations of
marriage to a man as opposed to a woman of a different race: "A male
ancestor has too much of the aura of the savage warrior, the unknown
primitive, the instinctive animal, to make him a respectable member of the

114. hI at 310.
115. Id.
116. Id.

117.

DELORIA, supra note 8,at 3.
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family tree. But a young Indian princess? Ah, there was royalty for the
1 18
taking."'
Not all intermarriages were between Indian women and white men. A

census taken in 1825 of the Alabama Cherokee, for example, found that fully
one third of white people married into the tribe were women."' Among the
members of the Iroquois Confederacy in New York, as well, several cases
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries concern white
women marrying tribal men.m
There is, however, probably some factual basis for the perception that most
of those Indians who intermarried were women. Both the Alabama Cherokee
and the New York Iroquois had remained well established and relatively
prosperous on their land after significant white settlement had taken place.
Due to federal removal of Indians from their lands and later facilitation of the

transfer of land to non-Indians under the General Allotment Act, few Indian
societies could claim these conditions. The single whites in Indian country
"
were typically men, including soldiers,' traders,' and missionaries.2
By the time unmarried white women began to arrive, the Indian men of that
area had probably been killed, removed, or so impoverished that they hardly
made attractive prospective mates."
But military force and Indian impoverishment were not the only forces
behind Indian-white marriages. Equally important, particularly in the earlier
years, seems to have been a practice of various Indian tribes of marrying into
an extratribal group to establish ties to that group. Jacqueline Peterson, in her

118. d.
119. M'KENNEY, supranote 76, at 38. According to the census, 13,563 were native citizens,
147 were white men married in the nation, 73 were intermarried white women, and 1277 were
African slaves. Id.
120. See, e.g., Woodin v. Seeley, 252 N.Y.S. 818 (Sup. Ct. 1931), affd, In re Woodin, 261
N.Y.S. 1042 (App. Div. 1933) (holding that son of white woman and Indian man was not Indian
so that he and his white wife could be ejected from Seneca land); Patterson v. Seneca Nation, 157
N.E. 734 (N.Y. 1927) (holding that state court had no jurisdiction to force Seneca Nation to enroll
son of Seneca man and white woman); Seneca Nation v. Lehley, 8 N.Y.S. 245 (Sup. Ct. 1889)
(holding that daughter of white woman and Seneca man was an Indian).
121. .g., Johnson v. Johnson's Administrator, 30 Mo. 72 (1860).
122. E.g., In re Liquor Election in Beltrami County, 163 N.W. 988 (Minn. 1917); Connolly
v. Woolrich, 17 R.J.R.Q. 75 (Que. Sup. Ct. 1867).
123. .g., Oakes v. United States, 172 F. 305 (1909).
124. John Wesley Powell noted the connection between removal and intermarriage in 1869.
finding that two constant objections made to removal to reservations were first, "[w]e do not wish
to desert the graves of our fathers," and second, "[w]e do not wish to give our women to the
embrace of the soldiers." JOHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMISSIONERS J.W.
POWELL AND G.W. INGALLS ON THE CONDITION OF THE UTE INDIANS OF UTAH; THE PAI-UTES
OF UTAH, NORTHERN ARIZONA, SOUTHERN NEVADA, AND SOUTHEASTERN CALIFORNIA; THE GOSI UTES OF UTAH AND NEVADA; THE NORTHWESTERN SHOSHONES OF IDAHO AND UTAH; AND
THE WESTERN SHOSHONES OF NEVADA 23-26 (Gov't Printing Office, 1874), reprinted in THE
INDIAN AND THE WHITE MAN, supra note 1, at 383.
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excellent dissertation on women in the fur trade, writes that many of the
Siouan and Alogonquin-speaking tribes of the Great Lakes region used
intermarriage to form and stabilize commercial and political alliances."z
Those tribes, she found, perceived "intermarriage as a means of entangling
strangers in a series of kinship obligations. Relatives by marriage were
expected not only to deal fairly, but to provide protection, hospitality, and
sustenance in time of famine.""
While Europeans might be compelled to intermarry for commercial
reasons,"2 Indian women were also an independent source of attraction for
the untamed country. Reports of their beauty returned to the Old World, such
as the following by John Lawson:
As for the Indian Women which now happen in my Way, when
young, and at Maturity, they are as fine shaped Creatures... as
any in the Universe. They are of a tawny complexion, their Eyes
very brisk and amorous, their Smiles afford the finest Composure
a Face can possess, their Hands are of the finest Make, with
small, long Fingers, and as soft as their Cheeks, and their whole
Bodies of a smooth Nature. They are not so uncouth or unlikely
and we suppose them, nor are they Strangers or not Proficients in
the soft Passion.'"
Such reports were accompanied by tales that Indian women were not only
easy to love, but easy to leave. "They never love beyond Retrieving their first
Indifferency," the same author wrote, "and when slighted, are as ready to
untie the Knot at one end, as you are at the other."'29 Despite this
encouragement of easy mating and leaving, stable relationships seem to have
been the rule rather than the exception.' Lawson lamented that he often
found that English men had "been so allured with that careless sort of Life,

125. JACQUELINE LOUISE PETERSON, THE PEOPLE INBETWEEN: INDIAN-WHITE MARRIAGE
AND THE GENESIS OF A METIS SOCIETY AND CULTURE INTHE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1680-1830,
at 87-88 (1981).
126. Id. at 88.
127. See, e.g., Connolly v. Woolrich, 17 R.J.R.Q. 75, 120 (Que. Sup. Ct. 1867) (describing
marriage between white furtrader and Cree woman to establish trading relationship).
128. JOHN LAWSON, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA: CONTAINING THE EXACT DESCRIPTION
AND NATURAL HISTORY OF THAT COUNTRY, TOGETHER WITH THE PRESENT STATE THEREOF AND
AJOURNAL OF ATHOUSAND MILES TRAVELED THROUGH SEVERAL NATIONS OF INDIANS, GIVING
A PARTICULAR ACCOUNT OF THEIR CUSTOMS, MANNERS, ETC. 194 (Frances L. Harriss ed., 2d
ed. 1952) (1937) (taken from the London edition of 1714), reprinted in THE INDIAN AND THE
WHITE MAN, supra note 1, at 44.
129. Id. at 199, reprinted in THE INDIAN AND THE WHITE MAN, supra note 1, at 50.
130. See PETERSON, supra note 125, at 8 (describing community of stable intermarried
couples of Green Baye, Wisconsin); Connolly, 17 R.J.R.Q. at 113-14 (quoting testimony by
furtraders about sacredness and stability of marriages).
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as to be constant to their Indian Wife, and her Relations, so long as they
lived, without ever desiring to return again amongst the English ....
For the women, intermarriage might have been a source of increased power
as broker between both worlds. The lovely but passive Indian woman, loved
and then easily discarded, was certainly not the only existing model. Indian
wives among the fur traders of the North American North West in particular
gained prestige and acclaim from both Indians and whites, and often
"exert[ed] as much influence within the fur trade household as their 'civilized'
White spouses." '
The records of Colonial Virginia, for another example, present a Pamunkey
woman whose relationship to her white lover was very different from that of
Pocahontas and Rolfe. Thirty five years after Pocahontas died in England, a
woman, probably a relative, ascended the Pamunkey throne. Queen
Cockacoeske was chief of the Pamunkeys between 1656 and 1686, and
worked within the Virginian colonial system to recapture some of the power
her people had lost since Powhatan's chiefdom.' During this time she had
a son by English Captain John West, whose first wife was rumored to have
left him over the affair." Although her half-white son attended the Queen
in meetings with the colonial government, and seems to have been expected
by the English to succeed her, upon her death the Pamunkey placed her niece
on the throne.'35
Neither the powerful Indian woman nor the Indianized white man,
however, were comfortable figures for the lawmakers of the dominant society
in its quest to eliminate the Indian problem by either removing or absorbing
the Indians. Cockoeskie is an obscure figure of colonial history, and the white
descendants of her son have never fought to prove their lineage. American
history and culture celebrates Pocahontas's spirit because it benefitted and was
ultimately contained by the white race. An early nineteenth century poem by
"Miss F. Caulkins, of New London CT," is an extraordinary testament to the
containment of the wild which we have celebrated in the intermarried Indian
woman:

131. LAwsON, supranote 128, at 196, reprinted in THE INDIAN AND THE WHITE MAN, supra
note 1, at 46.
132. PEMRSON, supra note 125, at 87. In a different context, the dual heritage of the mixed
blood families of the preremoval Southeastern tribes gave them the ability both to lead their tribes
to effectively hold off the encroachment of land hungry whites. Bob L. Blackburn, From Blood
Revenge 1o the Lighthorsemen: Evolution of Law Enforcement Institutions Among the Five
Civilized Tribes to 1861, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 49, 50-52 (1980). The rise of Indian leaders with
white fathers, however, may well have contributed to the death of matrilineality among these
tribes.
133. Martha W. McCartney, Cockacoeske, Queen of Pamunkey, Diplomat and Suzeraine, in
POWHATAN'S MANTLE: INDIANS IN THE COLONIAL SOUTHEAST 173 (Peter H. Wood et al. eds.,

1989).
134. Id. at 176, 192 n.32.
135. Id. at 190.
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Not though, the red-browed heroine, whose breast
Screen'd the brave captivefrom the axe's gleam;
Not Pocahontas,lov'd, renown'd, caress'd,
But meek Rebecca, is my gentle theme
Her - her I sing not - and yet her I sing Freedfrom earth-worship, cleans'dfrom rites obscene;
First Convert of the West! The Indian child
A Christianmatron stands -from whose sweet tongue
Flows the pure stream of English, undefil'd Flows the deep anthem, and eternalsong.'36

Prominent figures among assimilationist "Friends of the Indians" even
advocated intermarriage as a way both to assimilate the Indians and to
improve the white race:
Some prejudice, it is true, appears against the idea of admixture
or mingling . . . . But . . . while ten grains of Indian to one
hundred of white man might be injurious to the quality of the
white race, half a grain to one hundred might supply exactly the
element needed to improve it.... What happy result can there be
to the lamb, but in absorption, digestion, assimilation in the
substance of the lion. After this process he will be useful - as
part of the lion.'37
Both quotes reveal the duality of the white perceptions of the Indians.
Unassimilated, they were "injurious," "defiled," and treated as such - denied
citizenship, herded to reservations, and subject to miscegenation laws.
Absorbed to the point of invisibility, on the other hand, they were beneficial,
and even celebrated.
A primary site for this absorption was the women. Legal decisions and
legislative enactments reinforced this bivalent view. Both judges and
lawmakers encouraged white men to marry Indian women without assimilating
into their tribes, interpreted Indian marital customs to permit their husbands

136. Reprinted in THOMAS L. M'KENNEY, ON THE ORIGIN, HISTORY, CHARACrER, AND THE

WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF THE INDIANS, WITH A PLAN FOR THE PRESERVATION AND HAPPINESS
OF THE REMNANTS OF THAT PERSEcUrED RACE
RIGHTS].

66 (1846) [hereinafter M'KENNEY,

WRONGS &

137. PHILIP C. GARRETI, INDIAN CITIZENSHIP: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL LAKE
MOHONK CONFERENCE 8-11 (1886), reprintedin AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra
note 25, at 61-62. Miscegenation laws reflect this concern with the proportion of Indian to white

blood by permitting marriage between whites and those with a sufficiently small quantum of
Indian blood.
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to abandon them without legal obligation, and discouraged ties between
mother and child so long as those ties included affiliation with tribal relations.
2. Indian Women as Wives
a) Federal Cases: Status of the Non-Indian Husband
The unique legal status of Indians as members of "dependent sovereign
nations" attached a peculiar mix of privileges and liabilities to Indian status.
Indians throughout the nineteenth century found their rights to independence
on their own land repeatedly abrogated, and were persecuted when they
refused to remain on the ever smaller pieces of land they were allotted. With
the resulting constant upheaval and diminution of hunting lands, the Indian
people were not only legally and militarily beset but economically
impoverished. On the other hand, they were also immune from criminal
prosecution for crimes against Indians committed on Indian land. In addition,
as various treaties and then the Dawes Allotment Act divided and parcelled
out tribal lands in efforts to "civilize" the Indians through ownership of
private property, Indian status also equalled entitlement to often valuable
property. In the century before the Indian New Deal, the federal courts
considered a series of cases regarding which of the legal attributes of "Indianness" the white husbands of Indian women would hold.
The year after the Supreme Court decided Ladiga II, it held in United
States v. Rogers' that a white man who had intermarried and been adopted
into the Cherokee Nation was not exempt from federal criminal
jurisdiction. 39' It appeared from the pleadings that Rogers had fully
assimilated with the Nation:
[Rogers] voluntarily and of his free will removed to the portion
of the country west of the state of Arkansas, assigned and
belonging to the Cherokee tribe of Indians and did incorporate
himself with said tribe, and from that time forward became and
continued to be one of them, and made the same his home,
without any intention of returning to the said United States...
[A]fterwards [in same month] he intermarried with a Cherokee
Indian woman, according to the[ir] forms of marriage, and ...
continued to live with said Cherokee woman, as his wife, until
September, 1843, when she died, and by her had several children,

138. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1845).
139. At that time, Indians were not subject to state or federal prosecution for crimes against
Indians on Indian land. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). Congress altered this
situation by enacting Indian Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385, which gave
the federal courts criminal jurisdiction over murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill,

arson, burglary, and larceny within any territory in the United States. See United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (holding that Indian Appropriation Act is constitutional and gives
courts jurisdiction for crimes committed by Indians).
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now living in the Cherokee nation, which is his and their
home.'"
The decision was not necessary to prevent lawlessness in white communities;
the crime occurred on tribal lands in the Indian Territory west of Arkansas,
and the victim was another "white" man who had similarly joined the
Cherokee Nation."" Nor was it necessary to protect the Cherokee
community: Rogers had, through his adoption, subjected himself to the
jurisdiction of Cherokee laws."" Rather, the decision was an exercise in
line-drawing, prohibiting intermarriage from becoming a method through
which a white man could renounce his allegiance to the United States and join
4
an Indian nation."
The decision is cited as the beginning of the end of jurisprudence treating
Indians as foreign sovereigns. Justice Taney stated that the Cherokee Nation
was not
a separate and distinct government or nation, possessing political
rights and powers such as authorize them to receive and adopt, as
members of their state, the subjects or citizens of other states or
governments . . . and thereby to sever their allegiance and
citizenship from the states or governments to which they
previously appertained . . .
But while this decision has obvious implications for Indian sovereignty, it
effected the wives of intermarried white men as well. Their husbands could
no longer fully assimilate themselves with their people, but remained subject
to the authority of the white government, unable to regard an Indian nation
as sovereign in the way that their wives could. Following Rogers, legal shifts
in allegiance would occur only from the Indian, and almost always female,
side.
After Rogers effectively determined that Indian women would not be
vectors for increasingthe size of the tribes, the federal government soon came
to encourage the opposite process: intermarriage as a method to decrease
adherence to tribal custom. This process probably began with local federal
agents locating land to white husbands as the heads of families and state court
approval of these locations, such as that in Turner v. Fish, discussed

140. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 567-68.
141. Id. at 571.
142. See LAWs OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 90, at 92-94, (enacted Nov. 10,
1843). The statute stated that "[a]ny person so obtaining a license [to marry a Cherokee woman]
shall freely alienate himself from the protection of all other governments, and take an oath to
support the Constitution, and abide by the laws of the Cherokee Nation," or be subject to removal
as an intruder. Id. at 93.
143. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 569.
144. Id. at 570.
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above.' 5 By the Assimilationist Period, however, this process was codified
in federal statutes. The year after the Dawes Act was passed, Congress passed
a statute declaring that Indian women who married white men would thereby
become American citizens.'"
The law was ostensibly designed to protect Indian women from
unscrupulous white men who would marry them only to and gain rights to
Indian land. Although the statute responded to a real problem," 7 it equally
addressed the fear raised by Rogers that white men would assimilate with
their wives' tribes. The amendment was intended to ensure that the effect of
the Dawes Act would be to "mak[e] citizens of the United States instead of
making Indians of our citizens."' 48 The legislative history presents a
unwitting contrast between the two paths for intermarriage, the approved path
in which the Indian woman left her tribe for an allegiance with the United
States, and that in which her husband joined her people:
Mr. Ezra B. Taylor: Is not the object of this bill to prevent the
marriage or miscegenation of these degenerate whites with the
Indian squaws?
Mr. Weaver: The effect of the bill is to encourage Indians to
marry white men and become citizens of the United States. 49
In gaining United States citizenship, intermarried Indian women were to lose
their bonds with their tribes.
The amendment, however, did not affect the rights of those who had
married into the tribe prior to 1888. And in the early 1890s, the federal
government took action which effectively prevented the Five Civilized Tribes
of the Indian Territory from protecting their communities from those without
a commitment to tribal membership.
In 1894, the Senate established the Dawes Commission to investigate and
report on the best means to extinguish tribal title and divide the land among

145. See also supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text; Wells v. Thompson, 13 Ala. 793
(1848) (holding that white husband owned and could sell Creek wife's land) (discussed at infra
notes 204-05 and accompanying text).

146. Ch. 818, 25 Stat. 392 (1888). The act was titled, "An act in relation to marriage
between white men and Indian women."
147. See, for example, the story published by a mouthpiece of the assimilationist contingent
reporting a plot to marry off the children of a Creek man to get ownership and oil rights to his
valuable land. MarriagePlot Against Indian Boys and Girls Discovered, INDIAN's FRIEND, Nov.
1913, at 8 (vol. 26, no. 2). The children were sent to boarding schools for protection - the boys
to the (in)famous Carlisle school and the girl to an equivalent school in Arizona. Ironically, such
schools were the sites of enforced assimilation, often using cruelty to "kill the Indian to save the
man."
148. 19 CONG. REc. 6885, 6886 (1888).
149. Id.at 6886.
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individual Indians of those tribes." The main problem addressed by the
Commission was the status of the many whites claiming Indian citizenship
among them."' The Commission condemned the efforts of the tribes to
ensure that such whites would not be allotted tribal lands:
[E]very treaty, from 1828 to and including the treaty of 1866, was
based on this idea of exclusion of Indians from the whites and
nonparticipation by the whites in their political and industrial
affairs .... And, if now, the isolation and exclusiveness sought to
be given to them by our solemn treaties is destroyed, and they are
overrun by a population of strangers five times in number to their
own, it is not the fault of the government of the United States, but
comes from their own act in admitting whites to citizenship under
their laws and by inviting white people to come within their
jurisdiction .... They must have realized that when their policy
of maintaining an Indian community isolated from the whites was
abandoned for a time, it was abandoned forever."
In light of this history and the condition of the tribal court systems, the
Commission recommended that non-Indian tribunals determine who was
eligible for tribal citizenship.' Upon their recommendation the Commission
was empowered to review applications to tribal citizenship and prepare the
rolls that would alone constitute the membership of the tribes they
represented."
In Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, the Supreme Court considered appeals of
numerous decisions of the Commission, with 166 presented in printed briefs.
If the three appeals described in the opinion are representative, the decisions
represent a tremendous degree of interference with tribal definitions of
community. Faced with such results, the tribes might well regret ever
approving the marriage of a white to an Indian.
The first case concerned a William Stephens, who was born in Ohio to a
mixed blood woman 55 and white man and had moved back to Cherokee

150. See Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 447 (1899).
151. The Report notes that an 1890 census found that of those claiming Indian citizenship
50,055 were Indians by blood, 18,636 were colored Indians and freedmen, and 109,393 were
whites. The Commission estimated that in the four years since 1890, at least 250,000 whites had

moved onto the tribal lands. Id. at 447-48.
152. Id. at 448-49. Few will miss the irony of the Commission's reference to the "solemn
treaties" of the federal government, when each successive treaty constituted an abrogation of the
promises of the prior one to make more room for white settlers hungry for Indian land. It is
remarkable that in 1894 a branch of the federal government could chide the Indians for failing
to maintain a community isolated from the whites.
153.
154.
155.
Ellington

Id. at 451.
Ch. 398, 29 Stat. 321, 339 (1896).
Stephens' mother Sarah was born in the Old Cherokee Country in Kentucky to William
Shoe-Boots. She lost her Cherokee citizenship by removing off the Nation, according
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country with his mother to seek readmission for both of them in 1873. The
Chief of the Cherokees said he was convinced of the honesty and genuineness
of Stephens' claim and wished the tribal council to pass a motion for his
readmittance"
The Commission, however, denied Stephens' application
because the Cherokee Council had not yet memorialized his readmission. The
court of appeals for the Indian territory upheld the denial."s
The second appeal described was that of F.R. Robinson, a white man who
applied to be enrolled on the basis of his marriage to a woman of Choctaw
and Chickasaw blood in 1873. She had since died, and Robinson had
remarried to a white women in 1884. The Choctaw Nation opposed his
enrollment on the grounds that he had "forfeited his rights as such citizen by
abandonment or remarriage."' 58 The Dawes Commission, however, granted
his application for citizenship, which was upheld in court.
The final case described concerned the application of Richard Wiggs,
another white man, and his family for enrollment in the Chickasaw Nation.
Wiggs had married Chickasaw woman Georgia Allen in 18752"' Allen died
in 1876, and in 1886 Wiggs married Josie Lawson, a white woman, with
whom he had a daughter. The Commission held that Wiggs should be
enrolled. The appellate court directed that his wife and daughter were to be
enrolled as well."
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Fuller did not touch on the justice or
wisdom of these federal decisions of citizenship, but simply reiterated that the
government had the power to make them. Given paramount authority over
Indian tribes, he wrote, Congress had the power to empower the Dawes
Commission to determine who was entitled to citizenship and to make out
correct rolls of citizens, "an essential preliminary to effective action in
promotion of the best interests of the tribes.'' In the single recognition of
what this grant of power would mean for the Indian people, he noted that the

to a Cherokee constitutional provision that
whenever any citizen shall remove with his effects out of the limits of this Nation,
and become a citizen of any other government, all his rights and privileges as a
citizen of this Nation shall cease: Provided, nevertheless, That the National
Council shall have power to readmit, by law, to all the rights of citizenship, any
such person or persons who may, at any time, desire to return to the Nation, on
memorializing the National Council for such readmission.
CHEROKEE CONST. OF 1839, art I. § 2, quoted in Cherokee Nation v. Journeycake, 155 U.S. 196,
198 (1894).
156. Stephens, 174 U.S. at 470.
157. Id. at 471.
158. Id. at 472.
159. One should note that both Wiggs's and Robinson's short lived marriages were during
the period when the likelihood of allotments of Indian land to individuals was already common
knowledge. See Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76, 81 (1906).
160. Stephens, 174 U.S. at 473-74.
161. 1 at 488.
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legislation made a distinction between admission to citizenship and allotment
of property, as if "there might be circumstances under which the right to a
share in the latter would not necessarily follow from the concession of the
former."'6
Justice Fuller returned to this distinction seven years later in the Cherokee
Intermarriage Cases." The Cherokee Code stated that the "rights and
privileges herein conferred [through intermarriage] shall not extend to a right
of soil or interest in the vested funds of this Nation," unless such intermarried
persons contributed a specified sum to the general treasury.'" The Court
affirmed the appellate court's ruling that the law was valid, but only for those
who had intermarried after the law's enactment in 1875.
Justice Fuller's opinion in the Intermarriage Cases is perhaps most
interesting for its presentation of the ways in which Cherokee laws regarding
intermarriage developed reactively, responding to federal laws and decisions
of federal courts. For example, although the Cherokees had always had a
treaty right to permit white persons to reside in the Nation subject to
Cherokee laws, immediately after United States v. Rogers, the Cherokee
council passed an act stating that the Cherokees would exercise jurisdiction
over all those entering Cherokee lands."6 The Court noted that the Act was
aimed at regulating intermarriage with white men." Further, the Cherokee
Council adopted the law at issue in the Intermarraige Cases in 1874, when
the "rapidly growing value of Cherokee lands" and the imminence of
legislation making the land available to individual citizens was perceptible.' "
Moreover, although the Code had been enacted over twenty-five years before,
the question of its enforcement was not brought to the courts until 1903, a
few years after the Stephens decision. Then, faced with massive loss of
Cherokee lands to those who had once been married to blood Cherokees, a
large number of citizens by blood filed a protest with the Department of the
Interior against the participation of intermarried persons in the distribution of
the 4,420,406 acres then held communally by the Cherokee Nation."s
The opinion in the IntermarriageCases is sensitive to the significance of
various Cherokee declarations of membership. It distinguishes laws such as
the 1855 law regarding jurisdiction over non-Cherokees and that permitting
Cherokees by marriage to vote in tribal elections on the grounds that "[u]nder
the polity of the Cherokees citizenship and communal ownership were distinct

162. Id.
163. 203 U.S. 76 (1906).
164. CHEROKEE CODE art. 15, § 75 (effective Nov. 1, 1875), quoted in IntermarriageCases,
203 U.S. at 83.
165. IntermarriageCases, 203 U.S. at 81.

166. Id.
167. Id. at 82.
168. Id. at 77.
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things."'" Despite this perceptiveness, however, the Court held that until the
Cherokees codified this distinction in 1875, those who intermarried into the
Nation gained a right to communal tribal property. No less than the other
major fiederal decisions of the period, therefore, the decision helped to
facilitate the loss of tribal lands to non-Indians and the disappearance of the
tribal unit in favor of the male headed nuclear family.
b) States: Status of the Indian Wife
As the federal courts were effectively declaring that white husbands of
Indian women could gain their wives' rights to tribal property, but not their
national identity, state courts were creating a body of jurisprudence under
which men, Indian or white, had almost no legal obligation to their Indian
wives. The dominant view of judicial treatment of Indian marriage and
divorce is that stated by Felix Cohen, that "Indian tribes have been accorded
the widest possible latitude in regulating the domestic relations of their
members."'7 ° This established doctrine, and the extension of the general rule
that marriages would be upheld if valid where contracted, disguised the extent
to which assumptions regarding the dissolute nature of sexual relations with
Indian women often led courts to assume Indian marriages invalid without
question. In 1832, for example, Circuit Judge James Duane Doty ended an era
in the established Indian-white community of Green Bay, Wisconsin, by
indicting thirty-six of its principal male inhabitants for fornication with their
Indian and mixed-blood wives.' In 1917, moreover, only one year after the
Supreme Court announced that Indians cohabiting without the benefit of
marriage according to state law could not be prosecuted for adultery,'" the
Minnesota Supreme Court confidently declared that a majority of mixed blood
Indians were not the issue of lawful wedlock.'73
But more important, the dominant view disguises both the extent to which
nontribal courts read and interpreted sex-neutral tribal customs as existing for
the benefit of men at the expense of women and the extent to which
recognition of Indian customs was reserved for those the courts labeled
uncivilized and thus undeserving of the protection of law. This view also does
not acknowledge that the judicial interpretations of Indian customs damaged
women both by stigmatizing them as participants in what courts saw as illicit
intercourse and by leaving them economically insecure due to easy
abandonment. More objective descriptions of marriage among Indian tribes

169. Id. at 85.
170. COHEN, supra note 5, at 137.
171. PETERSON, supra note 125, at 1.

172. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916) (holding that Sioux Indians cohabiting
without benefit of state ceremony could not be prosecuted for adultery); see also Meister v.
Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877) (holding marriage unsanctified by minister orjustice of peace between
Indian woman and white man valid for laws of descent).
173. hire Liquor Election in Beltrami County, 163 N.W. 988, 989 (Minn. 1917).
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reveal that marriages were neither so easily entered, nor so frequently ended
as the courts present them. Nor was the judicial vision that emerged during
the nineteenth century inevitable even from the limited evidence of tribal
customs that American courts had to work with. In the conclusion of this part,
I present a Canadian opinion to demonstrate a very different approach to tribal
marriage customs that the American courts rejected.
The earliest cases presenting the doctrine of divorce by abandonment were,
like Ladiga, Alabama cases dealing with women remaining in the east after
Indian removal. Throughout the next century, judges cited these cases as
precedent in determining the effect of Indian marriages. Two of these
opinions concerned the validity of promissory notes made by Delilah Wall,
a Choctaw woman, in light of the common law rule against a married
woman's ability to contract." Delilah and David Wall had been married by
a justice of the peace in 1831, and had lived together until 1839 when David
left for the Choctaw country west of the Mississippi." 5 Although Delilah
executed the note at issue in Wall II after David left her, and executed that in
Wall I before, the court treated both as valid on the ground the husband took
no part of the wife's property under Choctaw law. As a consequence of this
"peculiarity," the court held, the wife must have the capacity to contract to
protect her property.'76
The gravamen of the opinions, however, is whether abandonment of an
Indian woman would dissolve a marriage. After stating that "[a]ll the
testimony in relation to rights of husband and wife, under Choctaw law, may
have been of a disputable or doubtful nature,"'" Justice Goldthwaite
proceeded to make law on that same doubtful testimony. The court
immediately cast the custom of relatively easy dissolution of marriage as one
designed for the convenience of the husband: "By [Choctaw] law, it appears
that the husband may at pleasure dissolve the relation. His abandonment is
evidence that he has done so."'76 The court hearkens to various classical
sources to justify the decision, stating that "[h]owever strange it may appear,

174. Wall v. Williams, 11 Ala. 826 (1847) (Wall If); Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48 (1845)
(Wall 1). Although the cases are cast as involving "Indians," the opinions reveal that even at this
point "Indian" did not necessarily mean one of full-blood. Delilah Wall was the daughter of a full
blood Indian woman and a Frenchman. Her husband David was one quarter Indian. Wall II, 11
Ala. at 828. The court treated both as Indians, stating: "The ignorance of the half breed is in
general quite equal to that of the Indian whose blood is unadulterated, and certainly requires the

same protection for his rights." d at 836.
175. Wall 1, 8 Ala. at 48. While the cases are evidence of the dislocation and separation of
husband and wife that may have occurred during Indian removal, the facts here suggest that
Wall's departure might have been a relief to his wife: Wall had killed a man in 1839 and left

Alabama to escape prosecution; from Choctaw country he sent Delilah letters threatening to return
and take
176.
177.
178.

away her child. Wall II, I I Ala. at 828.
Wall 1, 8 Ala. at 52.
Id at 50.
Id. at 52.
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at this day, that a marriage may thus easily be dissolved, the Choctaws are
scarcely worse than the Romans, who permitted a husband to dismiss his wife
for the most frivolous causes," ' ' and that "[m]arriages among the Indian
tribes must be regarded as taking place in a state of nature. . .. "' The
court's recognition of the custom, however, seems to stem from a disdain for
the perceived barbarism of the Indians, and it is grouped together with various
other privileges of state law also denied, to them:
Do our laws allow Indians to participate equally with us in our
civil and political privileges? Do they vote at our elections, or are
they represented in our legislature, or have they any concern as
jurors or magistrates, in the administration of justice? Are they
subject to our laws of marriage and divorce, and would we sustain
a.criminal prosecution for bigamy, if they should change their
wives and husbands at pleasure, and according to their own
customs, and contract new matrimonial alliances? I apprehend
that every one of these questions must be answered in the
negative ...."
The court also rejected the argument that because under the Treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek those Choctaws who desired to become citizens would remain
in Alabama and receive allotments of land, state law was applicable to them.
"The treaty secures to them the right of resuming at pleasure their status in
the tribe, without reference to time. . . .Considering the character of the
Indians, their indisposition to renounce native habits and association ... such
an assumption cannot be indulged."'" Because the tribe that Delilah Wall
was part of had, in the eyes of the court, insufficiently renounced their Indian
allegiance, her abandonment was equal to a divorce, dissolving any legal
relation to her husband.
There is evidence that the Alabama court and the later courts that held
abandonment to equal divorce under tribal law were misinterpreting that law.
Several sources note that separation was relatively rare and usually occurred
among childless couples,' and evidence from various tribes suggests that
while informal divorce was allowed, stable marriages were encouraged and
rewarded.M Indeed, according to the Meriam Report of 1928,
179. ld.
180. Wall II, 11 Ala. at 839.
181. Id.at 837-38.
182. Id.at 840. The treaty itself is not so ambiguous regarding whether allottees actually
become citizens. It states that "[e]ach Choctaw head of a family being desirous to remain and
become a citizen of the States, shall be permitted to do so." Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek art.
14, 7 Stat. 333, 335 (1830).
183. See Thompson, supra note 87, at 208-09; PErMRSON, supra note 125, at 203 (stating
divorce most common among childless couples in Great Lakes tribes); I JOHNSON, supra note
95,at 228-29 (noting separation rare among Tuscarora Iroquois despite ease of divorce).

184. Among the Sioux, "(a] woman who had been married only once and been faithful was
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[l]t is among the educated, sophisticated, and presumably 'civilized'
young Indians that the true moral delinquency exits.... With the
younger educated Indians, no longer influenced by the old tribal
domestic life and morals, the fluidity of Indian custom marriage and
divorce may become simply an opportunity for license.
Among more traditional Indians, complementary customs encouraging stability
and obligations of familial support worked to prevent abandonment.
Indeed, many of the marital customs decried by white reformers as
degrading to Indian women may have been created instead to benefit women.
The practice of having more than one or two wives, for example, may
frequently have been more a matter of sharing work than an accommodation
of male sexual desire. As one elderly Omaha man said in response to white
prohibition of polygamy, "I must take another wife ... my old wife is not
strong enough now to do all her work alone.""lr For this man at least, taking
another wife was a sign of concern and respect as much as one of fungibility.
In their study of domestic violence under Navajo common law, James and
Elsie Zion suggest that the tradition of marrying sisters was also a way to
ensure protection against domestic abuse where the couple would not live with
her family.' They state that the presence of multiple wives created a
woman-controlled family arrangement, in which a man would have difficulty
in dominating the tight-knit group of women."n Certainly, the growing
influence of non-Indian custom and law added little to the power or security
of the Indian woman.
Alabama's judicial "recognition" of Indian divorce in the Wall cases
prevented Delilah Wall from defending herself as afemme couvert. Ironically,
within this same period, the Tennessee Supreme Court used its recognition of

considered better than any other," and men were given the Wicasa award for male constancy.
HASSRICK, supra note 93, at 44, 48 (quoting Blue Whirlwind). The traditional Navajo marriage
ceremony was one at which clan elders would teach the newlyweds the law of marriage, saying,
"Don't divorce each other" and "Stay together nicely." Zion & Zion, supra note 4, at 413. And
among the Iroquois, the matrons of the tribe exerted thel'* influence to keep divorce rare. 1
JOHNSON, supra note 95, at 229.
185. PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION, supra note 28, at 765-66.
186. Quoted in LowM, supra note 89, at 82.
187. Zion & Zion, supra note 4, at 411. They tell the story of Hatot-cli-yazzi, son of Bi-

joshi, a prominent Navajo medicine man who desired to marry a woman from Ship Rock but was
unwilling to leave his land at Beautiful Mountain. The intended wife was reluctant to leave her
family, so it was arranged that he would marry her two sisters as well. In 1913, however, the
Indian agent William T. Shelton ordered two of the sisters to go away. Bi-joshi refused to
comply, and the three sisters were arrested while the father and the son were away. When they
came with several others to free the women, Shelton claimed it was a rebellion, and
General Hugh Scott and Twelfth Cavalry came to his aid. Bi-joshi ultimately surrendered to
prevent bloodshed, and the Navajo men who participated were jailed for twenty days for unlawful
assembly. Id. at 409-10.
188. Id. at 414.
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Cherokee marriage customs to declare that a separated woman was a femme
1 89
couvert and as such could not bring an action to recover her property.
Margaret Morgan had married Gideon Morgan in 1813 according to the
customs of the Cherokee tribe and had several children by him, but they were
living apart at the time of the suit." The "property" at issue was several
slaves Margaret's mother had given Margaret in 1828, whom were sold to
cover Gideon Morgan's debts. 9' Here, where an Indian woman was trying
to assert her property rights independent from those of her husband, the court
does not treat the separation as a "divorce by abandonment."
The Morgan court claimed that in recognizing the Cherokee marriage as
the equivalent of a state marriage, it was upholding the right of the tribe to
regulate marriage within its jurisdiction. This claim is patently hollow. One
of the few tribes to have written laws at this period, Cherokee law had long
established that "the property of Cherokee women after their marriage cannot
be dispo;ed of by their husbands, or levied upon by an officer to satisfy a
debt of the husband's contracting, contrary to her will and consent, and
disposable only at her option . . . ." This was particularly true for
Cherokee women marrying white men. A law enacted in 1819 declared that
the property of any Cherokee woman who married a white man was not
"subject to the disposal of her husband, contrary to her consent.""'
Moreover, while courts framed their recognition of abandonment of an
Indian woman as a divorce as an acknowledgement of tribal sovereignty over
domestic relations, they also tended to imply that because informal dissolution
was available, the prior "connexion" was not a marriage at all. Regarding the
ten year cohabitation and parenting of three children by Colonel Johnson, a
government agent in Indian country, with Tapissee, the daughter of a chief,
a Missouri court declared:
[I]t is clear that all such connexions, which have taken place
among the various tribes of North American Indians, either
between persons of pure Indian blood, or between half breeds,
or between the white and Indian races, must be regarded as a
mere illicit intercourse, and the offspring be considered as
illegitimate .... '
In addition, because a majority of these cases involved white men9" leaving

189. Morgan v. McGhee, 24 Tenn. (5 Humph.) 13 (1844).
190. It. at 13-14. Although the Morgans were remarried by Tennessee law in 1818, the
opinion rests on the validity of the 1813 Cherokee marriage agreement.
191. I. at 13.
192. Act of Nov. 2, 1829, LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 90, at 142-43.
193. I. at 10 (law enacted Nov. 2, 1819).
194. Johnson v. Johnson's Administrator, 30 Mo. 72 (1860).
195. Or, in at least two cases, "whiter" men. See Wall v. Williamson, 11 Ala. 826 (1847)
(husband of one-quarter Indian blood leaves wife of three quarters Indian blood); La Framboise
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Indian women when the possibility of return to civilization came along, judges
often framed divorce by abandonment as a male privilege. See, for example,
the language of the Johnson court: "[T]he understanding of the parties is that
the husband may dissolve the contract at his pleasure."'96 The Alabama
court described Indian marriage customs with an even greater gender slant:
"When a man found a woman he wished to marry, he made her a present of
a blanket and she became his wife - when he wished to dissolve the
marriage, he abandoned her.""
The women, moreover, were presented as degraded by their acquiescence
to this practice: they were concubines'96 or "article[s] of trade,"'" they
were "bought" and "abandoned."'a The reservation of Indian divorce for
uncivilized Indian women was made clear after, in a widely reported case, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court seemed to suggest that a man could divorce a white
woman by abandoning her and removing to Indian land."' Despite the
limiting nature of the facts of that case, the courts soon modified the doctrine
to suggest that Indian divorces would not be available if the court deemed the
parties to be insufficiently Indian. As the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified
in La Framboise v. Day,"z a man might be the son of a white man, might
speak English, might work as a clerk in a general store, yet still divorce his
Indian wife by leaving her if he observed Indian customs, "particularly in the
matter of buying and abandoning their women. '
Perhaps more important, husbands retained no legal obligations to their
Indian wives if they decided to move on: "It is plain that among the savage
tribes on this continent, marriage is merely a natural contract, and that neither
law, custom or religion has affixed to it any conditions or limitations or forms
other than what nature has itself proscribed."' Or, in the words of the
North Carolina Supreme Court, "it can never be held that mere cohabitation,

v. Day, 161 N.W. 529 (1917) (relatively assimilated half-blood man leaves full blood woman).
196. Jolmson, 30 Mo. at 72 (emphasis added); see id. at 87.
197. Wall v. Williams, 11 Ala. 826, 828-29 (1847) (emphasis added). Compare these
assertions with a more recent claim based on a study of domestic violence among the Navajo that
informal divorce was intended to allow a woman to quickly escape an abusive relationship. Zion
& Zion, supra note 4, at 419.
198. Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 53, 58 (1862) ("What occurred between Jane and George
was not a marriage but a state of concubinage.").
199. Schurz, supra note 82, at 20.
200. La Framboise, 161 N.W. at 530.
201. Cyr v. Walker, 116 P. 931 (Okla. 1911) (also reported at 35 L.R.A. (n.s.) 795). The
holding turned on the court's finding that Xavier Delonias, by birth a French Canadian, was not
subject to the laws of the United States but only those of the Pottawatomie tribe through his first
marriage and subsequent adoption into that tribe. lI at 935.
202. 161 N.W. 529 (Minn. 1917).
203. Id. at 531.
204. Johnson v. Johnson's Administrator, 30 Mo. 72, 88 (1860).
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with an understanding that it may cease at pleasure, can constitute a marriage,
or carry with it the rights and disabilities of that relation."'
Revealingly, the one case in which a court held that an Indian divorce was
invalid involved an Indian woman trying to abandon a white man. In Wells
and Wells v. Thompson,' Creek woman Mary Wells took her children and
moved to her father's home in Creek land after her white husband William
took up with another woman. Mary was later allotted land under the Treaty
of Dancing Rabbit Creek. After Mary's death in 1836, William sold her
allotted land. Their children challenged his claim to ownership and his right
to sell the land. The Alabama court held that William had inherited and
lawfully conveyed the land; because the separation did not occur on Indian
land, the marriage could not be dissolved by Creek custom."° The holding
that the separation must occur on Indian land contrasts with that in Cyr v.
Walker, discussed above, and with the low standards for finding abandonment
to equal divorce seen elsewhere.
The only widely reported opinion which espoused a similar doctrine to that
in Wells was the Canadian Connolly v. Woolrich.' There, however, it was
employed to hold that a white man had not legally divorced his Indian wife.
Connolly was brought by one of the six children of William Connolly, a white
man who had made fortune in the fur trade of western Canada, and Susanne
Pas-de-nom, daughter of a chief of the Cree tribe. The suit alleged that
Susanne was entitled one-half of William's large estate as his wife under
Canadian community property laws, and that the plaintiff, therefore, was
entitled to one twelfth of the estate. The court held that William's marriage
to Susanne was valid, and that his abandonment of Susanne did not constitute
a legal divorce. The opinion by Justice Monk was unusual for its holding, but
it is unique for the attention it brought to the facts and the moral framework
within which it interpreted them.'

205. State v. Ta-cha-na-tah, 64 N.C. 521, 523 (1870).
206. 13 Ala. 793 (1848).
207. (d. at 803.
208. 17 R.J.R.Q. 75 (Que. Sup. Ct. 1867), afftd, Johnstone v. Connolly, 17 R.J.R.Q. 266, 1
R.L.O.S. 253 (Quebec 1869). The case was a cause clfbre of the time. Douglas Sanders, Indian
Women: A Brief History of their Roles and Rights, 21 McGILL L.J. 656, 660 (1975).
209. Justice Monk may well have been influenced by the French Canadian receptiveness to
the amalgamation of peoples and cultures, reputed to be greater than that of the Englishinfluenced Americans. See, e.g., Douglas Sanders, Metis Rights in the PrairieProvincesand the
Northwest Territories: A Legal Interpretation,in THE FORGOTrEN PEOPLE: MEIrS AND NONSTATUS IN)IAN LAND CLAIMS 7-9 (Harry W. Daniels ed. 1979) (describing how the Northwest
Company encouraged fur traders to take Indian wives and authorized company factors to perform
civil marriages for them). We should not give Canada too much credit, however. Connolly was
decided only seven years before the Canadian government codified an alleged Indian custom that
an Indian women lost her tribal status by marrying an outsider. The Canadian Supreme Court
rejected a challenge to this provision of the Indian Act in Attorney-General of Canadav. Lavell,
1974 S.C.R. 1349 (Can.). The U.N. Human Rights Committee later ordered the law repealed,
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In 1803, when William was a young trader in Northwest territory, he
married Susanne Pas-de-nom according to Cree custom. They lived together
in various places in the territory until 1832 and had six children. During
this time, William rose from clerk to chief factor and member of the
Council of the Hudson Bay Company and accumulated great wealth. He
always introduced Susanne as his lawful wife, and others always recognized
her as such. In 1832, William moved with Susanne and some of the
children to Montreal." There, William married Julia Woolrich, his second
cousin. Susanne soon returned to Red River settlement and was supported
there in a convent until her death in 1862." ' William died in 1849,
leaving his estate to Julia and their two children." 2
There was "no proof to show that any intimation was given to Mrs.
Connolly of the occurrence which was about to take place" on the date
Connolly married his cousin. "It would appear that the Indian wife felt very
sensibly this desertion and Connolly's marriage to another woman."2 3 The
court specifically dismissed testimony that Susanne appeared to acquiesce,
or not feel this desertion both because it was internally inconsistent and
self-serving. Moreover, the court notes with remarkable perceptiveness that
there was nothing to show that what would be an expression of indifference
for a person of one culture might not be another's effort to maintain dignity
in the face of despair.2"
The facts of the opinion bring out the economic and social reasons a
white man might have for first marrying an Indian woman and then
discarding her for a white woman. Marriage to an Indian, particularly the
daughter of an influential chief, was often the only means to establish a
political or commercial relationship with the people of that tribe. Connolly's
nephew testified that his uncle had told him that had he not "bought"
Susanne, there would have been no trading with her people." 5 When
William had become rich in the territories, however, he returned to Canada.
There, Susanne was indeed "pas-de-nom," and her political connections
were neither known or respected. William's second wife, in contrast, was
not only white, but "a lady of good social position and of high
2 6
William exchanged wives when the first had become not
respectability.""
a social asset but a liability.

finding that the Act violated the right to freedom of association protected in article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In re Lovelace v. Canada, Communication
No. R/24 (July 31, 1981), U.N. Doe. CCPR/c/DR(XIII) R.6/24, GAOR A/36140.
210. Connolly v. Woolrich, 17 RJ.R.Q. at 78.
211. Id at 79.
212. Id. at 76.
213. ld. at 78.
214. Id. at 144.
215. Id. at 120.
216. Id. at 78.
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In a move unique to courts dealing with such abandonment, the court
melodramatically pointed out the impact of divorce without obligation to the
divorcee:
It is really very difficult to conceive how ... it is an understood
thing, a man takes a squaw, lives with her as long as it suits
him, and then discards her as he would a mistress. It is true he
thereby bastardizes and makes outcasts of his children; it is also
true that when youth and beauty have faded, when the purity
and dignity of innocence have been sullied, destroyed by the
contamination of unlawful passion, the trader consigns his
Indian wife and offspring to the contempt of the world;
dismisses her and leaves her to pass the wretched remnant of
her life in solitude and despair." 7
Further, perhaps with unconscious recognition that legal rules act not in
isolation but in a general framework of rules designed to prevent such
abandonment, the court suggested that, although adopting the Indian
ceremony of marriage, Europeans could not leave behind the European
framework of moral obligation: "That such is the custom of the country
among the natives, may or may not be the case; but the European settler
cannot act after this fashion.""1 8 Indeed, the opinion reprints testimony to
show that they did not. For example, furtrader Pierre Marois testified that,
"A man there cannot take more than one woman, and we regard this union
as the union of husband and wife here, and the union is also sacred.2 19
Mr. Herriot, who went to Hudson's Bay territory in 1808 and had also risen
to the position of chief factor, testified that he considered marriage
"according to the custom of the country" to be
as binding as if celebrated by an Arch-bishop .... [I]t was not
customary for the Europeans to take more than one wife; it was
not customary for the Europeans to take one wife and discard
her, and then take another. The marriage according to the
custom above described was considered a marriagefor life. I
considered it so. I know hundreds of people living and dying
with the woman they took in that way, and without any other
formalities. According to my opinion this marriage lasted
during the lifetime of the parties in as binding a manner as if
married by a clergyman.'

217. Id. at 118-19.
218. d at 78.
219. Id. at 113 (author's translation).
220. d at 114.
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In further contrast to the American courts, the Canadian court recognized
that the concubinage and marriage were conceptually distinct categories, and
the court would not assume that an otherwise upstanding man would engage
in the former. t Moreover, although the American courts also as a rule
recognized the validity of Indian marriages, few would state, as this court
did, that this form of marriage was
[E]ntitled to the respectful consideration of this Court. It exacts
the solemn consent of parents, and that of the parties who
choose each other, for good or for evil, as husband and wife it recognizes the tie and some of the sacred obligations of
married life.., a marriage according to the Crees would, in the
opinion of the Court, be as solemn and as binding in the eye of
the law, as many which the greatest English judges have
declared valid.'m
Despite this expansive language, the legal grounds on which the decision
turned were relatively narrow. Justice Monk held, as did the Alabama court
in Wells v. Thompson, that Connolly could not obtain an Indian divorce by
abandonment while within the Canadian jurisdiction.'m Justice Monk,
however, was unique in placing the impact of this clash of cultures on the
member of the insider culture rather than on the outsider. He recognized
that marriage to an Indian woman did not absolve the white man from the
moral obligations which underlie the legal obligation not to simply abandon
a wife of thirty two years. He also saw beyond the strangeness of Indian
marital customs - the absence of priest or justice of the peace, the giving
of material goods to notarize the marriage - to the public and solemn
nature of the event. American courts, blinded by their investment in
conceptions of barbarism and civilization, and interested in encouraging
white men to leave their Indian wives and renew their allegiance to the
dominant society, could not.

221. Id. at 109. The court distinguishes testimony that taking and discarding a woman was
common in the territories by pointing out that according to the testimony this practice was
generally confined to the lowest status members of the white fur trade. Id. at 119. The existence
of dual levels of interactions between fur-traders and Indian women is confirmed by books on
the subject. See Peterson, supra note 125, at 90; SYLVIA VAN KIRK, MANY TENDER TIEs 32

(1981).
222. Id. at 115-16.
223. Id. at 96 ("[li]t was not competent ...for Mr. Connolly to carry with him this common
law of England to Rat River in his knapsack, and much less could he bring back to Lower
Canada the law of repudiation in a bark canoe .... [H]e cannot ... invoke the Cree law of
divorce at will.").
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3. Indian Women as Mothers
One might expect that as non-Indian lawmakers tried to encourage
domesticity in Indian women, confinement to home and hearth, they would
encourage the close bonds which existed between Indian families and
children. The law regarding Indian mothers, however, shows that this was
rarely the case. In 1709, John Lawson stated that
[O]ne great Misfortune which often times attends those that
converse with these Savage Women, is, that they get Children by
them, which are seldom educated any otherwise than in a State of
Infidelity; for it is a certain Rule and Custom, amongst all of the
Savages of America ... to let the Children always fall to the
Woman's Lot. ...
This sentiment seems to have informed the case law of the nineteenth century.
While some tribes fought for the rights of mixed blood children to have the
rights -of Indians,' nontribal authorities acknowledged the non-Indian
heritage of children only when in the interest of their non-Indian fathers to do
so. If fathers desired responsibility for their children, the courts would do all
they could to effect such desires. The relationship of the child to the mother,
however, was often treated with suspicion or resistance by the courts. If the
mother had not renounced tribal ways, her status would often stigmatize the
child and was viewed as an impediment to the child's interest in assimilation.
During the assimilationist era, it was federal policy to recognize mixed
blood children as Indian for purposes of entitlement to benefits.2"
Legislation amending the Dawes Act explicitly stated that "all children born
of a marriage ...between a white man and an Indian woman" recognized
by her tribe would have the same right to tribal property of other

224. LAWSON, supranote 128, at 195, reprintedin THE INDIAN AND THE WHITE MAN, supra
note 1, at 46.
225. Farrell v. United States, 110 F. 942, 945 (8th Cir. 1901); see also Treaty with the
Ottawa and Chippewa, arts. 6, 9, 7 Stat. 491, 493-94 (1836); Treaty with the Menominies, art.
2, 7 Stat. 506, 507 (1836); Treaty with the Sacs & Foxes, art. 4, 7 Stat. 517, 518 (1836); Treaty
with the Sioux, art. 2, 7 Stat. 538, 539 (1837) (referring to the desire of the tribes to make
provision for their half-breed relatives and the reluctance of the federal government to grant
reservation lands for such purpose); CHEROKEE CONSTVITTION OF 1839, art. 3, § 5, quoted in
Cherokee Nation v. Joumeycake, 155 U.S. 196, 198 (1894) ("[Ihe descendants of Cherokee men
by all free women, except the African race, whose parents may have been living together as man
and wife, according to the customs and laws of this Nation, shall be entitled to all the rights and
privileges of this Nation as well as the posterity of Cherokee women by all free men.").
226. See, e.g., Agreement with the Indians of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in
Montana, ch. 398, 29 Stat. 321, 352, art. 9 (1896) ("It is understood and declared that whenever
the word Indian is used in this agreement it includes mixed bloods as well as full bloods.");
Agreement with the Indians of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana, ch. 398, section 9,
29 Stat. 321, 356, art. 10 (1896) (same).
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members. 7 Such laws, however, were based on the policy of encouraging
Indians to abandon their tribal relations and of civilizing tribal communities
through tribal allotments, rather than on any encouragement of the bonds
with the maternal community.2
For other purposes, the Indian mother was acknowledged only to stigmatize
the child. The common law rule was that the child followed the status of the
father.' This rule, however, was often evaded, especially where a privilege
of race was at issue. An early federal decision, for example, followed the
jurisprudence regarding the children of a slave and a nonslave to rule that the
child must follow the condition of the mother." That court held that it had
no jurisdiction to prosecute "the atrocious and willful murder ... without
provocation or excuse" of an "inoffensive idiot boy" based solely on
conflicting testimony that his mother, whom no one had ever seen, was an
Indian woman, or bad Indian blood in her veins.'
Another federal court ignored this common law rule to hold that although
the petitioner's father was a white Canadian, he was not white for purposes
of a statute providing that white persons who had been residents of the United
States for three years might apply for American citizenship. The court tersely
denied his application: "As a matter of fact, he is as much an Indian as a
white person, and might be classed with the one race as properly as the other.
Strictly speaking, he belongs to neither.""
Far from conferring any
advantage, for this judge, the mixed parentage of the applicant placed him
outside the privileges of any category.
Courts would violate established legal rules, however, to effect the will of
a doting father. A court might hold a marriage void as a grounds for
inheritance, yet acknowledge the legitimacy of their children for the same
purpose. The Missouri Supreme Court in Johnson v. Johnson'sAdministrator,
discussed above, found every evidence that the union of Colonel Johnson and
Tapissee "was not a marriage, nor are the children of such union capable of
inheriting from the father." 3 It ultimately held, however, that Johnson's two
daughters could inherit his large estate because he brought them up and
educated them
in conformity to his circumstances and condition in life; [they]
were introduced into society, after their education was finished,
as his daughters; remained inmates of his household after his

227. Ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 90 (1897).
228. Oakes v. United States, 172 F. 305, 308-09 (1909).
229. In re Liquor Election in Beltrami County, 163 N.W. 988, 989 (Minn. 1917); State v.
Nicolls, 112 P. 269 (Wash. 1910); Hatch v. Luckman, 118 N.Y.S. 689, 701 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
230. United States v. Sanders, 27 F. Cas. 950 (D. Ark. 1847) (No. 16,220).
231. Id. at 951.
232. In re Camille, 6 F. 256, 258-59 (D. Ore. 1880).
233. Johnson v. Johnson's Administrator, 30 Mo. 72, 84 (1860).
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removal to St. Louis in 1822, up to the period of their marriage,
arid were in all respects treated by him as a father would be
expected to conduct himself towards his legitimate children ....
and were finally provided for in a will, which left to them... the
bulk of his fortune, which amounted to about one hundred
thousand dollars.'
The court recognized their right to inheritance, simultaneously sanctioning
both the wishes of the father and the girls' abandonment of their mother and
her way of life.
The Washington Supreme Court, as well, held that the "so-called" marriage
of John T. Wilbur and Swinomish woman Kitty Follansbee was void under
the miscegenation acts in force at the time. Because Wilbur continually,
openly, and publicly acknowledged the boys as his sons, however, they were
his legitimate heirs. 5 A Texas court similarly held that Mary Sharpe was
the legitimate heir of William Patterson.' The court found that "although
there are some circumstances in evidence tending to show that it was not
Patterson's intention to, and that he did not believe that he had, legally
married [Mary's Creek mother]," his acknowledgement of their daughter Mary
and contribution to her support legitimized the child for purposes of
descent. 7
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the courts had created two
classes of mixed blood children for purposes of determining political status
as well. Those in the first class were
born under the sanction of marriage, the father being a white man
and a citizen, and maintaining an independent home; and the
mother, although an Indian, is by her marriage, and adoption of the
habits of civilized life, entirely separated from her Indian tribal
relatives. The half-breed children of such parents ...are ...
entitled to all the rights and privileges, and immunities of other
citizens; and they are as distinct from the other class of half-breeds
which I have described as any other civilized people are distinct
from savages.
Attempis of the mother to change this status were resisted. In United States
v. Higgins, 9 for example, a mixed blood Indian woman married a white
man and moved with him off the reservation. When her son was seventeen,

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
man and
239.

Id.at 85.
Follansbee v. Wilbur, 44 P. 262, 263 (Wash. 1896)
First National Bank of Austin v. Sharpe, 33 S.W. 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
Id.at 677.
United States v. Hadley, 99 F. 437, 438 (D.Wash. 1900) (holding that child of white
Indian woman could not be indicted under statute regulating crimes by Indians).
110 F. 609 (D. Mont. 1901).
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she moved with him back to the reservation where he grew to manhood and
became chief of police. In adjudicating whether Higgins was white or
Indian, the court declared that "[tihe mother of Oliver Gibeau could not, by
taking him with her to an Indian tribe, and securing his adoption into the
same, deprive her sone [sic] of the rights of a white man and of a citizen."24'
Those raised with the Indian tribe, on the other hand, were barred from
these rights of citizenship. The Minnesota Supreme Court discusses this issue
at length in In re Liquor Election in Beltrami County.2 The court there
considered whether numerous mixed-blood men were citizens entitled to vote
under Minnesota law. It decided that they were not:
It is true that a mixed blood Indian is a citizen if his father
was.... And no doubt more mixed bloods spring from a white
father and an Indian or mixed-blood mother than from a white
mother and an Indian or mixed-blood father. But it is also
probably true that very many of the mixed bloods of a white
father are not the issue of lawful wedlock. An illegitimate child
takes the status of the mother. 3
The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had "reached a degree of
civilization superior to that manifested by many white men."'
Their
insufficient connection with their citizen fathers, however, made them
ineligible to vote.
Courts also disparaged the matrilineal tradition of many tribes. In Hatch
v. Luckman, s for example, one judge stated of matrilineality among the
New York Seneca that, "[t]his ancient custom comes down from barbaric
days, when the marital relations were loose and uncertain and it was often
difficult to determine the paternity of a child."'
He saw no reason to
continue to observe this custom given the advances in education and
civilization of the tribe.'
In Hatch, the court overruled the custom of
distributing property in a "Dead Feast" presided over by a clan mother. The
court justifies the decision to do so in the name of "protect[ing] the interests
of the family in reservation lands."24
But the court was reading "the interests of the family" to mean those of the
male owner of the land in determining his heir. It is true that, in Hatch, a

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 610.
Id. at 611.
163 N.W. 988 (Minn. 1917).
Id. at 989.
Id.

245. Hatch v. Luckman, 118 N.Y.S. 689 (Sup. Ct. 1909) (holding traditional Dead Feast void

as method of determining descent of land).
246. Id. at 701.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 702.
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woman, the daughter of the male decedent, benefitted from the court's
decision to trump tribal custom. The distribution of the land authorized by the
clan mother accorded with the Seneca custom of descent according to
matrilineal clan membership, because the mother of the plaintiff Phoebe Hatch
was not a member of the tribe or clan in whose name the property was passed
down. The court claimed that to uphold this tradition of matrilineal descent
and to deny patrilineal descent would be "a travesty of justice."u
Notwithstanding tribal custom, in other words, fathers, not mothers, would
have the last word on what would happen to family property after death."
Courts even found it in the best interests of children to separate them their
Indian mothers altogether. In so doing, they followed a practice in place well
before and well after the Assimilation Period. In fact, the abduction of the
twelve-year-old Pocahontas by Captain Smith may have been a romanticized
implementation of an unexecuted 1609 plan to kidnap Indian children to
thereby ensure their eventual conversion."' While taking children from their
families was no longer an explicit federal goal after the 1930s, social services
agencies continued to remove Indian children from their homes in shocking
numbers until the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978."
While such removals were often too automatic to even appear in published
opinions in the nineteenth century, the opinion in In re Can-Ah-Couqua'3 well
presents the philosophy behind these tragic actions. Can-Ah-Couqua was a
habeas action brought by an Alaskan native for the release of her eight year old
son Can-ca-dach from a missionary school. She had voluntarily sent him to
school in 1883, but she had not been allowed to see him in the four years since
then. The court held that the child should remain in the custody of the school
citing "the experience of those who have been engaged in these Indian schools
that, to make them effectual as disseminators of civilization, Indian children
should, at a tender and impressionable age, be entirely withdrawn from the
camp, and placed under the control of the schools."''a The judge suggested
that the petitioning mother's very life was destructive of her love for her child,
stating, "the profligate and dissolute life she has lived has not entirely
extinguished the natural affection and love of a mother's heart ...

249. Id.
250. ld.
at 703. Alice Lee Jemison, an outspoken Iroquois political figure, protested against
this granting of rights to those whose mothers were not of the relevant tribe. Jemison herself was
the child of a Cherokee father and a Seneca mother. HAUPTMAN, supra note 51, at 62-63.

251. See Patricia Kunesh-Hartman, Comment, The Indian Welfare Act of 1978: Protecting
Essential Tribal Interests, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 131, 135 n.18 (1989).
252. Pib. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1994)).
253. 29 F. 687 (D. Alaska 1887).
254. Id. at 689.
255. Id. at 690.
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Although denying her the right to take the child from the school, he granted
Can-ah-couqua the right to see her son - under surveillance.'
The practice of removing Indian children to boarding schools far from their
families actually encouraged the "profligacy" the court condemned in In re
Can-Ah-Couqua. The authors of the 1928 Meriam Report found that
"[n]ormally husband and wife have a strong bond in their common
responsibility for children. To take away this responsibility is to encourage
a series of unions with all the bad social consequences that accompany
impermanence of marital relations."' Children might never return, but die
of tuberculosis and other epidemics at the harsh boarding schools." The
effect of the schools, moreover, was that even those who survived would
return strangers, ill at ease with the life they had been schooled to reject.
Nor did the schools prepare the girls for a better life outside the tribal
community. Boarding schools not only deprived the girls of education in the
traditional sources of strength for Indian women, they trained them to be
servants to middle-class women pursuing the cult of domesticity. The Meriam
Report condemned the so-called "outing system," a corner stone of the
boarding schools, on these grounds. To ensure that the female pupils would
not backslide into Indian ways, the girls were "placed out" during vacation to
give them experience with a non-Indian family. The report found, however,
that the system was "not so much a preparation for homemaking as an
apprenticeship for domestic service." 9
The girls work for wages, mostly under city conditions; they are
in demand with families whose regular maids want to go home or
to do something more profitable during the summer; the work in
practice often leads to a permanent job on leaving school. So far
as any implicit intention can be perceived it is the fitting of Indian
girls for domestic service, the one occupation where there is
always a demand for labor because of the social stigma popularly
attached to it.m
The section states, "[I]t is difficult to understand why the government,
avowedly educating its wards for a place in white civilization, should have
prepared the girls almost exclusively for the least desirable of the gainful
occupations open to women. '

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
of racial

Id.
PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION, supra note 29, at 576.
Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 640. Karl Marx might have had less difficulty understanding this reinforcement
and class hierarchy.
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Thus, while lawmakers espoused the nineteenth century vision of the
family, their vision excluded strong tribal traditions of motherhood. Having
an Indian mother, for one of mixed blood, mattered only if your non-Indian
father had abandoned you. Whatever one's blood quantum, courts and policy
makers saw the influence of an Indian mother as pernicious, a factor that
would inhibit beneficial assimilation. They therefore resisted tribal tradition
of strong bonds between mother and child. A better substitute, however, was
not put in its place: denied the education and experiences important within the
tribal community, children, particularly girls separated from their mothers,
were prepared only to be servants in the non-Indian world.
IV. Tribal Treatment of Indian Women

-

The Influence of Non-Indian Law

The Pocahontas story presents a compelling allegory of the ways in which
tribes were affected by government actions regarding Indian women, and of how
some tribes ultimately responded. At the end of Walt Disney's story, both Indian
and white are enriched and unharmed by the encounter. Captain Smith and all
the Europeans sail away from the New World, leaving Pocahontas waving on
the shore, intact in her Indian world and belief system, surrounded by her
animal friends. In the full story, Pocahontas not only lost her belief system and
national identity, but her position between the two cultures proved physically
disastrous for the Indians of her region. By sparing first Captain Smith and then
the fledgling Jamestown colony, (at least in John Smith's apocryphal account),
her presence allowed the European colonists to take hold in Virginia and
eventually throughout the South.' As the first Chief of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs wrote in 1846, this was the beginning of the extinction of the Indians of
that region a
Indian tribes eventually took precautions against the negative results of
marriage with outsiders. Pocahontas' own tribe now prohibits white husbands
of Indian women from living on the reservation.'
The effect of this
prohibition is that this formerly matrilineal triben now forces Pamunkey
women to abandon tribal land.

262. Had Disney looked a little further down the line, they would have seen the Pamunkey,
once the most powerful tribe in Virginia, now with only 60 people living on a 1250-acre
reservation 40 miles from Richmond. Joe Volz, Pocahontas'Legacy: Law on Mixed Marriages
Threatens Tribe's Future, Cii. TRiB., Apr. 9, 1989, at 7.
263. M'KENNEY, WRONGS & RiGirrs, supra note 136, at 60. M'Kenney points to the role
of Massachusetts chief Massasoit in performing the same role in the North East:
From the two points, Jamestown and Plymouth, went forth the element which, in

the order of time, brought about this subjection of the Indian race. And now trace
those elements back to their source, and in what, I ask, did they originate? In the
humanity, I answer, and the generosity of Pocahontas and of Massasoit,
Id. at 73.
264. Volz, supra note 262, at 7.
265. See McCartney, supra note 133, at 173, on matrilineality among the Pamunkey.
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In 1978, the Supreme Court considered a challenge under the Indian Civil
Rights Act to a similar law. Under the constitution of the Santa Clara Pueblo
Tribe, children of Santa Claran women and non-Santa Claran men were not
eligible for tribal membership.' The children of Santa Claran men who
married outside the tribe, however, were eligible for membership. 7 The Court
declared hands off. In an opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the
Court held that concern for tribal sovereignty prohibited the Court from
interfering with the ability of the tribe to define its own community.
In her article Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States and the Federal
Courts, Judith Resnik provides an excellent examination of the way in which
federal control in the drafting of such tribal constitutions may have influenced
the insertion of this discriminatory provision' She notes that the Bureau of
Indian Affairs had a tremendous influence in the preparation of all of such
Indian Reorganization Act constitutions. They prepared model constitutions,
which were largely adopted without alteration, and commented on and approved
all alterations by the tribes. The constitution adopted by the tribe in 1935
did not discriminate as to gender and left the tribal council power to approve
membership for those who did not meet the membership criteria. That same
year, however, the BIA distributed a circular stating that Congress would limit
application of federal benefits to tribal members, and planned "to urge and insist
that any constitutional provision conferring automatic tribal membership upon
children hereafter born, should limit such membership to persons who
reasonably can be expected to participate in tribal relations and affairs."' In
1939, the tribe amended its constitution to limit membership to children of Santa
Claran men.' And in 1978, the tribe defended this provision by stating that
children of female members were more likely to be raised as cultural
outsiders.'
There is little to support a conclusion that the discriminatory nature of this
amendment was the direct result of federal pressure or encouragement. Only
one of the other BIA constitutions examined in a recent survey of the 220 tribal
constitutions2' similarly discriminates against women, that of the Cachil Dehe
Band of Wintun Indians of California. The provision there was clearly intended
to punish and expel women who married non-Indians, providing that "[i]f a
female member marries a non-Indian, she will automatically lose her

266. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). There, the plaintiff had not

married a white man, but a Navajo. Id.at 52.
267. Id. at 52 n.2.
268. Resnik, supra note 4, at 712-25.

269.
270.
271.
272.

ld. at 712-14.
Id.at 715.
Id.at 716.
Id. at 717.

273. ElmerR. Rusco, Civil Liberties GuaranteesUnder TribalLaw: A Survey of Civil Rights

Provisionsin Tribal Constitutions, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 269, 284 (1990).
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membership and will be required to leave the Community within ninety days
after written notice has been served on her by the Business Committee."' 4
The three other comparable provisions cited in the survey actually
discriminate against men. Until 1993, the Constitution of the Hopi Tribe of
Arizona provided that members were those on the census roles in 1936, children
whose parents are both Hopi, and those "whose mother is a member of the Hopi
Tribe, and whose father is a member of some other tribe.""7s Children of Hopi
men and non-Hopi women might only become members upon majority vote of
the council. The constitution of the Creeks of the Kialegee Tribal Town
similarly provided that "[a]ll children born of female Kialegee members shall
become members of the Town regardless of the status of their fathers," while
children of Kialegee men and non-Kialegee women might only become
members upon a majority vote of the members at any Kialegee membership
meeting.' 6 And children of women of the Pueblo of Laguna in New Mexico
automatically became tribal members regardless of marital status, while only
children born in lawful wedlock to male members were entitled to automatic
membership status.'
The discriminatory Santa Clara and Cachil Dehe provisions are simply too
anomalous to make a strong case for direct federal pressure. The history
discussed in the preceding sections, however, supports the argument that state
and federal actions were responsible for the diminished view of Indian women
in the eyes of their tribes. With the occupation of formerly Indian lands, the
game hunting which had comprised much of the male economic role and social
identity virtually disappearede 8 Federal policy encouraged men to make up
for this by taking the position of farmer and land holder that women had
occupied. From the end of the century on, the federal government itself stepped
in to replace Indian women's role in raising their children. As the case law
shows, moreover, federal and state courts in the nineteenth century carved a role
for women in which they were little more than a means for Indian lands to pass

274. CONST. & BY-LAWS FOR THE CACHIL DEHE BAND WINTUN INDIANS OF T-IE COLUSA
INDIAN COMMUNITY CALIFORNIA art. I1, § 4.
275. CONST. & BY LAWS OF THE HOpi TRIBE ARIZ. art. II, § 1 (adopted 1936). The
constitution was amended in 1993 to permit enrollment by persons with one-quarter Hopi or
Tewa blood from either mother or father.
276. CONST. & BY-LAws OF THE KIALEGEE TRIBAL TOWN OKLA. art. Ill, §§ 3-5 (adopted
1941).
277. CONST. & BYLAWS OFTHE PUEBLO LAGUNA N.M. art. I1,§ l(d)(l), (2) (adopted 1958).
278. Carol Devens argues that the greater receptivity to Christianity of seventeenth century
Huron men may be attributable to similar causes. See Devens, supra note 89, at 461, 474-75,
reprinted in PROBLEMS IN WOMEN'S HISTORY, supra note 11, at 26, 32-33. "Christianity
apparently appealed to men who no longer identified themselves primarily as hunters. In
precontact culture ... [h]unting provided the very foundation of a man's social and religious
identity. It seems likely that a spiritual crisis may have been the culminating factor in a man's
decision to convert." Id. at 474, reprinted in PROBLEMS IN WOMEN'S HISTORY, supra note 11,
at 32.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol21/iss1/2

No. 1]

INDIAN WOMEN AND THE LAW

53

to white husbands. Both through indirect influence and direct imposition, nonIndian family and political structures in which women were secondary began to
replace those in which they had wielded significant power.
A 1928 New York state case, In re Herne, presents one example of this
imposition.' Herne concerned the right of a St. Regis Mohawk Indian, Mary
Lazore, to possess lands on the St. Regis reservation. The elected tribal chiefs
sought to have her removed as an intruder on a reservation under New York
law. Lazore said that she was a member of the St. Regis tribe, was grandmother
and guardian "by Indian custom" of her grandson Robert Williams, the son of
her deceased daughter, and was occupying the premises for him while he
attended a school for the deaf. Lazore was born on the St. Regis reservation on
the American side. All her life, however, she had received annuity money
allotted to the Canadian St. Regis Indians and had never received any annuity
money from the state of New York.' With little discussion, the court decided
that the exclusive reception of benefits from Canada made Lazore a Canadian
Indian removable as an intruder on American Indian land.2'
Remember the Ladiga cases? Here, almost a century later, another
grandmother is being kicked off her land. This time, however, it is at the hands
of her own tribe. At least as much as in Ladiga, the court in Herne ignores the
traditions of matrilineal descent and female land ownership of the tribe
implicated. More important, the terse three page opinion completely fails to
mention the conflict between the traditional, woman centered tribal government
and the official state-imposed one that may well have inspired the tribal action.
As with most Iroquois tribes, the position of chief was hereditary, based on
matrilineal clan membership, and chiefs were selected by the clan mothers with
the advice of other women of the tribe.' New York state, however, had
instituted a system of elected tribal government that broke this tradition. Many
St. Regis Indians resisted the imposition of a foreign governmental system.
Only about 25% of tribal members participated in the elections.'
Many
women, who had traditionally exercised their significant influence outside of
electoral politics, probably chose not to participate at all.
At the time Herne was decided, the elected government was in bitter rivalry
with those supporting the traditional government.' It is not hard to imagine
that the elected chiefs were prompted to remove Lazore out of desire to remove
a troublesome matriarch from this heated political scene. In declaring her
removal legal, therefore, the court supported a very limited segment of tribal

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

In re Herne, 232 N.Y.S. 415 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
Id. at 416.
Id. at 416-17.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
See HAUPTMAN, supra note 51, at 69.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 64.
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opinion. Even more, it supported the government the State Legislature had itself
imposed.
Tribal actions that negatively affected women's traditional status were not
always so closely tied to the implementation of non-Indian goals. Cherokee law
shows a gradual and deliberate adoption of non-Indian stereotypes regarding the
role of women. Many of the early Cherokee laws evidence a desire to protect
women both from abusive white husbands and from scornful state courts. While
marriage by public declaration and ceremony was the rule for inter-Cherokee
marriages, as early as 1819 a white man marrying a Cherokee women was
required to do so "legally by a minister of the gospel or other authorized person,
after procuring license from the National Clerk for that purpose, before he shall
be entitled and admitted to the privilege of citizenship, and in order to avoid
imposition on the part of any white man."' The law further declared that the
property of any Cherokee woman who married a white man
shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, contrary to
her consent, and any white man so married and parting from his
wifa without just provocation, shall forfeit and pay to his wife
such sum or sums, as may be adjudged to her by the National
Committee and Council for said breach of marriage, and be
deprived of citizenship ....
A few years later, the Cherokee council made clear that this law regarding
property was simply an extension of Cherokee tradition for all Cherokee women
with an explicit codification of the "established custom" of the Cherokee Nation
that the property of a Cherokee woman could not be controlled by her husband
or attached by his creditors.
With these written affirmations of Cherokee women's independence, however,
came other laws which decreased her status. In 1825, the tribe broke with the
mafrilineal Cherokee tradition by legislating that children of Cherokee men and
white women, living in the Cherokee nation as man and wife are "equally
entitled to all the immunities and privileges enjoyed by the citizens descending
from the Cherokee race, by the mother's side."' In 1826, the tribe outlawed
the traditional practice of abortion, providing for a punishment of 50 lashes to
the woman committing "infanticide ...during pregnancy" and accessories
thereto.
These changes may be traced to the Cherokees rapid adoption of white
religion and government." In the same month that the anti-abortion law was

286. LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 90, at 10 (enacted Nov. 2, 1819).

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id.
Id. at 142-43 (enacted Nov. 2, 1829).
Id.
at 54 (enacted Nov. 10, 1825).
Id.
at 79 (enacted Oct. 16, 1826).
A letter from David Brown, a member of the southeastern Cherokees, provides a good
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enacted, the council also passed a law that "no person who disbelieves the
existence of the Creator, and of rewards and punishments after death, shall be
eligible to hold any office under the government of the Cherokee Nation, nor
be allowed the privilege of his or her testimony in any court of justice."' In
the constitutions of 1827 and 1839, the Cherokee adopted the dominant society's
exclusion of women from politics: article 3, section 5 stated that only free
Cherokee males were eligible for seats on the General Council, and section 7
provided that only free male citizens had the right to vote in Cherokee elections.
Although the Cherokees used white forms of government and culture to
maintain their sovereignty and independence from the United States - and were
so successful that federal policy makers decided to move them to the remote
Indian territory to decrease their power' - the empowerment of the
Cherokee male leaders became a disempowerment of the women.
Sometimes measures oppressive to women were borrowed from white culture
directly in quasi-religious efforts to ward off white encroachment. Although
slightly before the chronological scope of this article, the Shawnee code of the
early 1800s is such an interesting mixture of adoption and resistance that I
report it here!" The code early reveals an adoption of the Christian value of
monogamy, stating in article 2 that the Shawnee were not to have more than
one wife in the future so as to please the Great Spirit. In article 6, moreover,
the code declared that medicine bags were to be destroyed and medicine dances
and songs to exist no more and that those who had used them were to make
open confession to the Great Spirit of their wrong.

picture of the extent of adoption of white ways by the 1820s.
Butter and cheese are seen on Cherokee tables. There are many public roads in the
nation, and houses of entertainment kept by natives. . . .Cotton and woolen
clothes are manufactured here. Blankets, of various dimensions, manufactured by
Cherokee hands, are very ommon ....Industry and commercial enterprise are
extending themselves in every part. Nearly all the merchants in the nation are
native Cherokees. Agricultural pursuits . . .engage the chief attention of the
people. Different branches in mechanics are pursued.
David Brown, Letter of September 2, 1850, in M'KENNEY, MEMOIRS, supra note 76, at 37-38.
292. LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 90, at 77 (enacted Oct. 13, 1826).
293. See 2 THE GREAT FATHER, supra note 6, at 189 (stating that the adoption of the
1827 constitution caused great alarm and fanned desires for Indian removal); M'KENNEY,
MEMOIRS, supra note 76, at 38 n. ("[W]hen a just appreciation of the Cherokees of their own
advances in the mechanics and the arts, and religion, caused them to cling closer and closer
to their beautiful country, and to refuse to sell or exchange it ... they would be forced to
cross the Mississippi ....").
294. The code was formulated by Tenskawatawa, known as the "Shawnee Prophet" and twin
brother of Tecumseh. Thomas Forsythe recorded it in a letter to General William Clark of
December 23, 1812. The code is reprinted in Thompson, supra note 87, at 214-18. Although
fascinating, Forsythe's reporting should be regarded with some suspicion; Forsythe also claimed,
for example, that the Sauk and Fox ate human flesh to make themselves brave. The charge of
cannibalism was common among early Indian observers, but seems to have been more myth than
reality.
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Although the law thus codifies two of the major precepts of white
missionaries, it is clearly inspired by vehement rejection of everything white: the
Shawnee were not to eat anything cooked or raised by a white person," were
not to sell white people provisions and were to try not to buy merchandise from
them, and were to return all white people's dress as well as dogs and cats
not of Indian breeds to the white people from which they came.' Those who
did not follow this code were bad people who must be put to death.'
Within this code, so clearly a reaction to white American culture, are several
startling provisions specifically directed at women. As in the Cherokee code,
abortion was prohibited and barrenness was stated to be a reason for putting
away a wife. m Article 4 sanctions domestic abuse of women and male control
of the household:

If any married woman was to behave ill by not paying proper
attention to her work ... the husband had a right to punish her with
a rod and as soon as the punishment was over, both husband and
wife were to look each other in the face and laugh, and to bear no
ill will to each other for what had passed."

Article 5 prohibits cohabitation between Indian women and white men and
orders that mixed blood children be abandoned: "All Indian women who were

living with white men were to be brought home to their friends and relations,
and their children to be left with their fathers, so that the nations might become

genuine Indians."'" Although not explicitly stated, this juxtaposition makes
one wonder whether female independence had itself become one of the evils to
overcome to effectively ward off the depredations of the whites.3 ' Although

295. Id. at 215.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. Thompson states that in 1809 a Kickapoo man was burned for refusing to give back
his medicine bag.
299. Id. at 216.
300. Id. at 215.
301. Id.
302. Reports of the Jesuit missionaries to New France in the early seventeenth century
suggest that female independence had clearly become demonized there. Selected reports from
Jesuit Relations are reprinted in PROBLEMS INWOMEN'S HISTORY, supra note 11, at 22. Faced
with the disappearance of their traditional way of life and the resistance of Indian women to
conversicn, Indian men came to blame them for their changing world. One priest reports a
council at which the men berated the women that
It is you women ... who are the cause of all our misfortunes, - it is you who
keep the demons among us. You do not urge to be baptized.... You are lazy
about going to prayers; when you pass before the cross, you never salute it; you
wish to be independent. Now know that you will obey your husbands ... and, if
any fail to do so, we have concluded to give them nothing to eat.
Id. Upon hearing this, one young woman fled into the woods. The men searched for her and,
having found her, came to the Jesuits to ask if "it would not be well to chain her by one foot; and
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the "Shawnee prophet" was clearly trying to fortify his people against white
invasion, he had decided that the way to do so was to adopt white-derived
monotheism and male domination of women.
Measures excluding women might also be inspired by non-Indian policies
that distributed scarce tribal resources among designated "members," making it
convenient to limit membership along gendered lines and thereby punish women
who married outside the tribe. The membership provision at issue in Santa
Clara Pueblo seems to be one example of this. The tribal actions described in
Vezina v. United States" are another. There, in an opinion whose attention to
the details of the lives of women living between white and Indian worlds recalls
that in Connolly v. Wool, 4 the Eighth Circuit ruled on the "Indian-ness" of a
woman who might easily have been a descendant of Susan Pas-de-nom. The
Vezina court overruled repeated decisions of the White Earth Chippewa that
Elizabeth Vezina had abandoned her tribal membership and found that Vezina
was entitled to an allotment under the Dawes Act.
To reach this conclusion, the court describes three generations of Indian
women. While Elizabeth's grandfather Kah-we-tah-wah-mo was a full blood
Chippewa,' the blood quantum of her grandmother Therese was unknown.
Therese, however, "looked like an Indian women; she had black hair, which she
wore down her back, wore moccasins, and, besides doing her domestic duties,
did a great amount of bead work and was an Indian doctor."' She and her
husband lived in a teepee, where the plaintiffs mother Isabel was born.
Isabel married a Canadian Frenchman at fourteen and never lived on the
White Earth Reservation. However, she also lived the life of an Indian
woman. She lived in a teepee during much of her life and like her mother,
"wore her hair down her back, made moccasins for sale, did bead work and
sold the same . . . aside from domestic duties, was an Indian doctor and
midwife; she walked pigeon-toed, as most Indian women do . . .
Furthermore, she "frequently went out with others on buffalo hunts, carrying
a pack on her back; she smoked a red clay pipe."3 ' Even towards the end
of her life in Minneapolis, one witness testified, she "looked like an Indian
squaw; she wore no stockings, but in winter wore cloths wrapped about her
legs.""
The plaintiff was born in the mixed blood community of Red River, probably
the third of ten or eleven children born to Isabel Delaney.1 Although nearly
if it would be enough to make her pass four days and four nights without eating, as penance for
her fault." Id.
303. 245 F. 411 (8th Cir. 1917).
304. See supra notes 208-20.
305. Vezina, 245 F. at 413.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 414.
309. Id. at 413.
310. When the Delaneys moved from the Indian community of Fond du Lac to the mixed
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all of her brothers and sisters married mixed bloods or Indians, Elizabeth
married Canadian Frenchman Joseph Vezina.31' The court says little about
Elizabeth's Indian characteristics other than that she was issued mixed blood
scrip in 1863 (later declared void due to fraud in its issuance),"' had lived in
broken Chippewa while her mother spoke
tepees, and spoke French and
3 3
Chippewa and broken French.
On March 15, 1889, three months after Congress passed an act authorizing
allotment of Chippewa lands in Minnesota in conformance with the Dawes
Act,314 Elizabeth and Joseph moved to the reservation town of White Earth. 35"
In 1903, Elizabeth's husband moved back to Minneapolis and died there, but she
remaine 3.1 6 She moved to reservation land outside of town and built a house
and two barns, a barbed wire fence, and grubbed timber and brush from one and
a half acres of land." 7 By the time of the decision, Elizabeth was 88 years old
and had lived on the reservation for almost thirty years.
On November 21, 1889, after negotiations with the Chippewa, the allotment
act was ratified.3 8 The federal commissioners charged with determining how
to allot the land decided to sell unallotted pine lands and divide the money
among the enrolled Chippewas. Thus, although there was more than enough
land for all those claiming Chippewa membership to receive allotments, "every
member of the council acquired a direct personal interest adverse to any
claimant to an allotment" as further allotments would reduce the revenue due to
each member from sale of the unallotted lands.3"9 The Chippewa were "much
divided" regarding Elizabeth Vezina's claim to be listed with the commissioners
and given an allotment. White Cloud, the principal chief, made a personal
investigation and was in her favor as were many others."2 The Chippewa
council, however, never voted to have her added to the original membership list
and refused to hear the matter again, ensuring that she would not become legally
entitled to her land. 2

blood community of Red River, "they first traveled with a dog team, and when they came to the
river they crossed it in bark canoes, and then carried the canoes to the next lake until they got
through." Id. at 413.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 414.
313. Id. Elizabeth testified at her trial through an interpreter, and many of the witnesses at
the trial were in part of Indian blood and "their English [was] not of that clearness which could
be desired." Id. at 412.
314. Ironically, the act was titled, "An act for the relief and civilization of the Chippewa
Indians in the state of Minnesota." Ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642 (enacted Jan. 14, 1889).
315. Vezina, 245 F. at 412.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 415.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. In 1909, the lands Isabel Vezina lived on were allotted to Pah-dub. He apparently never
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Several times between 1892 and 1907, the Commissioners considered her
claim for membership and allotment, alternately deciding for and against her."
In 1907, the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs wrote to the Superintendent
of the White Earth Chippewa Agency requesting that he present the matter of
her allotment to the White Earth Council 3 The Superintendent did this in
January, 1908, and wrote back that "[i]n order that you may know how the
Indians feel regarding enrollment, I will say that no one attended this council,
or appeared, except one or two chiefs."3 When these chiefs told the
Superintendent that a general council was being held that month, he asked that
these applications for allotment be presented then, and "was advised that they
did not care to take up any of these applications." The council later refused to
have the matter brought before them. In the opinion of the Superintendent, "this
old woman has rights on this reservation; there is no doubt about her Indian
blood .... It seems to me that it would be a good lesson to the Indians to
enroll 3this woman, when they refuse to give her case the consideration it should
have. 2
The Eighth Circuit found that Isabel Vezina and her mother had not
abandoned their tribal membership. First, the tribe had not consistently found
abandonment in such circumstances: "The evidence shows a considerable
number of persons born off the reservation, and who reached middle life before
the treaty of January 14, 1889, and who then moved to the reservation, were
'
More
recognized, enrolled, and secured allotments upon the reservation."ra
and
trifling
important, the court held that it "should not find upon light
circumstances that an Indian has forfeited his citizenship in his tribe and [has]
in no method acquired any other citizenship, but has become literally a man
without a country."3 In a distinctly patriarchal conclusion, the court found
that this was even more so in case of intermarried Indian women: "It should
take especially strong evidence that an Indian woman has abandoned her tribe
simply by living with her husband, which she ought to do by the laws of both
God and man."3

lived on the lands but sold them to a non-Indian. Id. at 412.
322. Id. at 416.
323. Id. at 417.
324. Id. at 418.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 419.
327. Id. at 420.

328. Id. In an ironic epilogue, the Eighth Circuit rejected the rights of her son and daughter
to remain on the land that they had occupied for twenty years. Yezina v. United States, 284 F.
695 (8th Cir. 1922). Vezina had been given an allotment by the Indian Commissioner in 1902
pending his enrollment. He built a house, a barn and granary, grubbed 38 acres, and had lived
there ever since. Id. at 697. When his buildings burnt down in 1918, he spent $2500 rebuilding
because the commissioner and he believed that he would get his land. Id. at 698. He was then
ejected by Luckman Land Company, to whom the legal allottees sold the land. Id. at 695.
Although Vezina was enrolled in 1920 pending the appeal of his case, neither this nor the time
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In Vezina, tribe and court have switched places, with the tribe rejecting and
the court upholding an elderly woman's rights to right to the tribal property she
had lived on for years. Perhaps the Chippewa were motivated simply by greed
and the desire to increase the unclaimed land available for sale, perhaps they
were also soured by years of Indian women intermarrying with wealthier traders,
perhaps they were even resentful of the ability of mixed bloods like Elizabeth
Vezina and her children to hold on to and cultivate their lands while less
assimilated Chippewas quickly lost theirs to white speculators. Whatever the
reason, the Chippewa decided to exclude a woman whose mother and
grandmother were Indian doctors, who had grown up in tepees, from those who
counted as Indian. To teach these Indians "a good lesson," and to affirm the
obligation of women to follow their husbands, the Eighth Circuit overturned.
V. Conclusion: Beyond Pocahontas
The circle is complete. The stories in this article began with the displacement
of Indian women from what lawmakers saw as a male role, that of the head of
a family and the cultivator of land. They continued with an image of women
as vectors for assimilation, conduits for tribal property who could be easily
abandoned if they retained their adherence to tribal custom and the displacement
of women from the traditionally female role of motherhood in favor of the
father and civilizing influence of school. They end with tribes taking up where
courts and the federal government had left off, denying Indian women land,
rights to participate in politics, to pass their membership to their children, to
control their own reproduction, even to get angry when their husbands beat
them.
In summary, the cases reveal three ways in which Indian women became a
particular focus for the regulation of the status of Indians. First, there are the
cases which determine the status of Indian women in their own right. Indian
women possessed a degree of autonomy in public life and control over those
areas designated women's work that was foreign to the newer, non-Indian
culture. State and federal judges and lawmakers either failed to recognize these
sources of power and treated Indian women as they would the relatively
powerless white women, or dismissed aspects of this power, such as matrilineal
lines of descent and the role of clanswomen in the Iroquois nations, as the
products of a primitive and inferior culture.
But the case law of this period perhaps more pervasively affected women
through regulating their familial relationships, particularly those of marriage and
motherhood. As wives, Indian women lost power in two ways during this
period. First, the courts construed the Indian custom of divorce without
formalities to mean that white or Indian men could dissolve marriages with

and money he had spent on his land were held to establish collateral estoppel for his ejectment.
Id. at 699. His appeal of ejectment was denied.
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Indian women by simple abandonment, leaving no legal obligation to the
abandoned wife or her children. Second, although preventing full assimilation
of white husbands into Indian communities, the courts endowed non-Indian
husbands with the right to own and to dispose of the Indian wife's share of
tribal property. Taken together, these lines of decision made the marriage of
Indian women to white men a practice through which the Indian community
could only lose.
The case law regarding Indian women as mothers also evidences the
displacement of Indian women who had not fully assimilated. While the
common law rule was that children would follow the status of their father,
courts tended to either ignore this rule, or to assume illegitimacy of the child to
deny children of Indian women and white men the privileges of their fathers.
While they might evade legal rules to effect a father's wishes for purposes of
inheritance law, moreover, they would take a child from his mother to educate
him, or deny a tradition of matrilineal descent as the hallmark of a profligate
race. Ultimately, influence over children was a power that was discouraged in
the unassimilated woman's hands.
In these stories we hear the crash of two sets of conflicting values. The first
is that between white and Indian needs. The more powerful white society first
tried to resolve this conflict by containing the Indians on reservations and then
by absorbing them. The second is that between the Indian vision of womanhood
and the vision developing in American culture. In this American vision, the
good woman was a passive helpmeet, placed on a pedestal by a man, but not
working beside him. The Indian woman was often selected as the target for
both of these points of conflict.
At the level of cultural assimilation, the autonomy of the Indian woman had
to be subordinated to that of the male head of the nuclear family. From being
she who worked, who controlled lines of descent, who may even have ruled
politically, she was to become she who inspired others to work and who
depended on others for her support. As traditional sources of power were taken
from Indian men, they may also have developed their own interest in taking
power from the women. At the level of physical assimilation, the very body of
the Indian woman became the locus for absorption of her descendants into the
white race. Intermarried, she was not only the vessel for the dilution of Indian
blood, but a method by which tribal property might leave Indian hands.
It is not surprising that some women took this path, ever intermarrying until
they became no more than the legendary Indian princess in some white family
tree. Nor is it surprising that some Indian tribes came to resent such women, if
not for their actual status as vectors for assimilation, then for the appearance of
being vectors that judges, lawmakers, and "reformers" had created. What is
surprising is that so many women resisted the pressure to become vectors for
assimilation, remaining strong independent figures in the fight to preserve tribal
integrity.
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Many Indian women emerged as strong independent voices in tribal and
national politics in the early twentieth century. Sioux woman Gertrude Bonnin,
or Zitkala-sa, returned to her native beliefs after a Catholic and European
education, and became a significant influence in the Indian New Deal?" Lyda
Burton Conley, a Wyandot woman, in 1910 successfully fought to save the
Huron Indian Cemetery in Kansas from federal destruction and became the first
person to argue for the sanctity of Native American burial grounds before the
Supreme Court?3' Mohawk women successfully resisted the vote for
ratification of the Indian New Deal, an action which ultimately lead to New
York becoming the only state not to participate in the plan.3 ' Alice Lee
Jemison, a Seneca woman, was one of the most prominent activists of her
generation, repeatedly testifying before Congress against the Indian New Deal
and for Iroquois sovereignty'
Jemison was code-named "Pocahontas" in the surveillance files the
government kept on her,333 but the contrast with her namesake is stark.
Pocahontas, whoever she might have become had she lived, died at twenty-two,
killed by a disease of her husband's people. It is Pocahontas, however, who is
remembered in Hollywood, in pop songs, and by the white people who claim
her as an ancestor. She quickly became a malleable figure of myth, perhaps
helping non-Indian Americans to assuage our guilt at what we have done to her
people. It is time to acknowledge the other Indian woman in American history,
who collided with and sometimes broke the boxes the law was making for her.

329. See Alison Bernstein, A Mixed Record: The Political Enfranchisement of American
Indian Women During the Indian New Deal, 23 J. WEST 13 (1984).
330. See Kim Dayton, 'Trespassers,Beware!": Lyda Burton Conley and the Battlefor the
Huron Place Cemetery, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (1996).
331. HAURTMAN, supra note 51, at 68-69. Interestingly, another powerful Indian nation that
has retained elements of its tradition of female power, the Navajo, also chose not to adopt the
IRA.
332. Id. at 35.
333. Id. at 53.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol21/iss1/2

